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DECISION THEORY AND THE PRE-TRIAL RELEASE
DECISION IN CRIMINAL CASES*
STUART NAGEL,** MARIAN NEEF,*** AND SARAH SLAVIN SCHRAMM****

This article sets a framework for analyzing how a rational
judge sets bond in individual criminal cases in order to maximize
given goals. The assumed goals relate to maximizing the probabilities of the defendant appearingin court and his being released
prior to trial and also minimizing 'the costs of rearrestingbailjumpers, pretrial crime-committing, jail maintenance, lost gross
nationalproduct, and the bitterness that comes from being held
in jail prior to trial when the case is dismissed or the defendant
acquitted. The goal maximization is analyzed in the context of
elementary decision theory working with both non-monetary and
monetary values. The article is also concerned with deducing a
set of policy recommendationsthat are designed to cause arraignment judges to become more sensitive to avoiding errors of holding defendants who would appear, relative to avoiding errors of
releasing defendants who would fail to appear. Furthermore,the
authors suggest that the concepts and methods of decision theory
which are applied to the pre-trialrelease decision can also be used
by analogy to analyze other criminal justice decisions that involve contingent events; for example, those decisions made by a
• This is the third article in a series of three dealing with the application of decision
theory to legal process decision-making. The first dealt with group decision-making. See
Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and FractionRequired to Convict, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 979 (1976). The second article dealt with two-person
decision-making. See Nagel & Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium
Models, 51 IND. L.J. 987, 52 IND. L.J. 1 (1976). This present article deals with one-person
decision-making, which is the perspective most broadly applicable to the legal process since
so many important discretionary decisions are made by a single police officer, lawyer, judge,
or individual members of a group.
Thanks are owed to the LEAA National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, the Ford Foundation Public Policy Committee, and the University of Illinois Law
and Society Program for financing various aspects of the legal policy research of which this
paper is a part, although none of them are responsible for the ideas advocated here. Thanks
are also owed for comments on earlier drafts to Leslie Wilkins of SUNY-Albany, Allan Goldman of the National Bureau of Standards, Herbert Miller and William McDonald of the
Georgetown Law School, Paul Lermack of Bradley University, Daniel Fried of the Yale Law
School, and Joseph Ebersole of the Federal Judicial Center.
•* Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois and member of the Illinois
bar.
•
Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Illinois.
•
Ph.D. candidate in political science at George Washington University.
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police officer to arrestratherthan issue a summons, by a prosecutor or defense counsel to go to trial rather than accept an out-ofcourt

settlement,

and by a gentencing judge or parole board to

incarcerate or continue incarceration.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, much concern has been expressed with regard
to the lack of uniformity and effectiveness of sentencing in criminal
cases. As both a cause and a result of that concern, there has been
an increase in the number of studies of the sentencing decision
especially (1) studies seeking to describe, explain, and decrease the
non-uniformity and (2) studies seeking to determine the effects of
diverse sentences, including benefit-cost analyses of would-be criminal behavior in light of the deterrent effect of possible conviction
and sentencing.' The sentencing stage of the criminal justice pro1. On disuniformity in sentencing, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973). On the lack of effectiveness of sentences designed to rehabilitate, see Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 THE PUB. INTEREST 22
(1974). On the possible effectiveness of sentences designed to deter, see F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973).
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cess, however, may be a marvel of uniformity and effectiveness in
comparison to the pre-trial release stage. In spite of that, there has
been little analysis of the great diversity from judge to judge with
regard to pre-trial release. There has likewise been little analysis of
the effects of bond-setting on the probability of a defendant appearing in court. For awhile, though a flurry of studies did occur dealing
with release on recognizance and preventive detention A major
purpose of this article is to analyze the pre-trial release decision
from a decision theory perspective which emphasizes the possible
benefits and costs to arraignment judges and to society under various circumstances.
More specifically, decision theory can be defined as the study
of which of various available decisions should be reached in order
to maximize benefits minus costs in light of the probable occurrence
of uncertain events.' In the context of pre-trial release, the available
decisions are: (1) to release on a low bond or on the defendant's own
recognizance; or (2) to hold on a high bond or on a non-bondable
charge. The key probabilistic events are whether or not the defendant will appear in court, and whether or not the defendant will
commit a crime while released. Although this article is primarily
concerned with the pre-trial release decision, much of the analysis
is applicable by analogy to other stages in the criminal justice process which also involve probabilistic decisions. Those stages include
a police officer's decision to make an arrest contingent on the approval of his superior officers, a prosecutor's decision to plea bargain
contingent on the probability of obtaining a conviction, a juror's
2. Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use
of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.UL. REv. 67 (1963); Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS, Civ. LIB. L. REV. 289 (1971); Wald, The Right to Bail Revisited:
A Decade of Promise Without Fulfillment, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 177-205 (Nagel ed.
1972).
3. For general discussions of decision theory, see S. RICHMOND, OPERATIONS RESEARCH FOR
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 527-60 (1968); W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS
RESEARCH

550-68 (1965); H.

UNDER UNCERTAINTY

RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICE

(1968); R.

MACK, PLANNING ON UNCERTAINTY: DECISION MAKING IN

Busi-

NESS AND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION (1971). For discussions of decision theory applied to

pre-trial release and other criminal justice matters, see Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 79 (1973); J. Locke, Compilation and use of Criminal
Court Data in Relation to Pre-Trial Release of Defendants: Pilot Study 112-15 (1970); G.
MONKMAN, READINGS IN CORRECTIONAL ECONOMICS (1973); Fried, et al., Jury Selection: An
Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (Simon ed. 1975); and Stover
and Brown, Reducing Rule Violations by Police,Judges, and Corrective Officials in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MODELING (Nagel

ed. 1977).
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decision to convict contingent on the probability that the defendant
is guilty, and a parole board's decision to release contingent on the
inmate's likelihood of repeating his crime especially while he is on
parole.
In addition to providing a better understanding of decision
theory and the pre-trial release decision, the analysis presented in
this paper is designed to serve a number of functions relevant to
improving the pre-trial release process. Through decision theory as
the basis for gathering data from arraignment judges, a researcher
can indicate to the judges various types of biases they might have
in their pre-trial release decisions but not be clearly aware of, especially with regard to their relative concern for avoiding an error of
holding someone who would appear versus releasing someone who
would have failed to appear. The decision theory perspective also
provides a means for determining the implicit threshold probabilities which various judges have in making pre-trial release decisions.
Revealing those probabilities to a set of judges on the same court
may help to bring the more deviant judges closer to the average.
Knowing those probabilities may also be a step to explaining the
causes of the variation among judges, cases, and places. That kind
of causal analysis can aid in determining the effects on decisions of
changes in benefits, costs, or probabilities or of changes in their
visibility. The benefit-cost aspects may also clarify the need for
more pre-trial release of marginal defendants. The complete analysis may be especially useful in developing objective bond schedules
or charts analogous to the objective decision-making charts used in
workmen's compensation cases and increasingly being proposed for
flat sentencing in criminal cases. Such bond schedules could conceivably pinpoint the bonds that should be set for various crimes in
order to maximize the benefits of defendants appearing in court
minus the costs of having to hold defendants in jail.
II.

THE RELEASING AND BOND-SErrING DECISION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

The bond-setting decision is an especially good decision making
situation to illustrate various aspects of decision theory because it
involves many contingent events, many alternative decisions rather
than a simple dichotomy, both monetary and non-monetary values,
both individualized cases and different case types, and both de-

DECISION THEORY

19771

scriptive and optimizing elements. 4 These features of the bondsetting decision will be defined and clarified in the following article.
We begin with the individual case where judicial discretion is important, and then later deal with non-discretionary bond schedules
where legislatures or state supreme courts specify fixed bonds for
various case types. Within the individual case, we first treat the
release-versus-hold decision from both a non-monetary and a monetary perspective, and we then deal with the bond-setting decision
which is more complicated than the simple dichotomy of releasing
or holding.
A.

The Release or Hold Decision
1.

NON-MONETARY VALUES

The decision to release a defendant can take the form of releasing
the defendant on his own recognizance without any bond (ROR) or
setting a bond low relative to the defendant's ability to pay. The
decision to hold can take the form of labeling the case a "no bond
allowed" case or setting a bond high relative to the defendant's
ability to pay. Figure 1 gives the payoff matrices for two hypothetical judges in the same case. A payoff matrix shows the satisfaction
or dissatisfaction received or perceived by a decision-maker or a
collectivity from each available decision and each possible occurrence of some uncertain event. A payoff matrix is a useful way of
analyzing decisions, not necessarily a way of explicitly making
them. In the pre-trial release context, there are two alternative deci-

sions available, namely release or hold. There are likewise two alternative categories on the contingent event: (1) the defendant would
appear if released; or (2) the defendant would fail to appear if released. The cells indicate the relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction
received by each judge if he releases the defendant who then fails
4. Books on pre-trial release, bond setting, and related matters include STUDIES ON BAIL

(Foote ed. 1966), especially at 4-15 and 74-88; P. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY
OF PRE-TRIAL RELEASE (1974), especially at 25-34; D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED
STATES (1964); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE (1968); R. GOLDFARB, RANsoM: A CRITIQUE OF THE BAIL SYSTEM (1965); K. BorrOMLEY, PRISON BEFORE TRIAL: A STUDY
OF REMAND DECISIONS IN MAGISTRATE COURTS (1970); W. THOMAS, A DECADE OF BAIL REFORM
(1976); B. MAHONEY, AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS (1975); J. MULLEN, PRE-TRIAL SERVICES: AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH (1975); Silverstein, Bail in the States: A Field Study and Report, 50
MINN. L. REV. 621 (1966).
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to appear (cell a); if he releases the defendant who does appear (cell
b); if he holds the defendant when he would have failed to appear
if released (cell c); and if he holds the defendant when he would
have appeared if released (cell d). The most satisfying occurrence
is anchored at +100, and the most dissatisfying is anchored at
-100. The cell entries shown in Figure 1 are hypothetical, but Figure 2 to be discussed later deals with how such values may be
empirically derived.
FIGURE 1. DECISION THEORY PAYOFF MATRICES AS PERCEIVED
BY TWO ARRAIGNMENT JUDGES DECIDING WHETHER OR
NOT TO RELEASE A DEFENDANT
IA.

A JUDGE WHO IS MORE WORRIED ABOUT HOLDING A GOOD-RISK
DEFENDANT THAN RELEASING A BAD-RISK DEFENDANT (oriented toward avoiding type 1 errors)
PROBABILITY OF

APPEARANCE (PA)
Would Fail

Would

to Appear

Appear

a
Release via
RORor Low Bond

ALTERNATIVE
DECISIONS
AVAILABLE

lB.

b
+100

-50

C
Hold via
No or High Bond

EXPECTED VALUE IF PA -. 6

(.4) (-50) + (.6) (+100) = +40

d
-100

+75

(4) (+75) + (.6) (-100) = -30

A JUDGE WHO IS MORE WORRIED ABOUT RELEASING A BADRISK DEFENDANT THAN HOLDING A GOOD-RISK DEFENDANT
(oriented toward avoiding type 2 errors)
PROBABILITY OF
APPEARANCE (PA)
Would Fail
to Appear
a
Release via
ROR or Low Bond

ALTERNATIVE
DECISIONS
AVAILABLE

Would
Appear
b

-100
c

Hold via
No or High Bond

EXPECTED VALUE IF PA =.6

+25

(.4) (-100) + (.6) (+25) = -25

-10

(.4) (+100) + (.6) (-10)

d
+100

+34

Cells indicate relative satisfaction of each occurrence with the most satisfying
anchored at +100 and the most dissatisfying anchored at -100.
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The judge in Figure 1A is more worried about holding a goodrisk defendant than releasing a bad-risk defendant, as indicated by
the fact that he gets the most dissatisfaction from cell d. On the
other hand, the judge in Figure 1B is more worried about releasing
a bad-risk defendant than holding a good-risk defendant,5 as indicated by the fact that he gets the most dissatisfaction from cell a.
We assume that both judges are hearing the same case in the same
city so that the differences in their perceived payoff values reflect
their attitudinal differences. Otherwise, the differences might reflect the severity of the defendant's criminal behavior since the
same judge could have a payoff matrix like 1B for a homicidal
maniac, but a payoff matrix like 1A for a jaywalker. Likewise, a

judge in a city that has high holding costs relative to releasing costs
might have a payoff matrix like 1A, but a judge in a city that has
high releasing costs relative to holding costs might have a payoff
matrix like lB. Holding costs in this context might refer to jail
upkeep, lost earnings, and bitterness due to mis-arrests, whereas
releasing costs refer to the costs due to rearresting no-shows and the
monetary and psychological costs of crime committed by released
defendants.
Suppose both judges perceive the defendant as having a probability of appearing (or PA) of about .60. If either judge were to be
confronted with ten such defendants, this means about six would
appear for their trial date and four would fail to appear. If the same
defendant were to be given ten opportunities, this means about six
times he would appear and four times he would fail to appear. Thus,
the expected values for Judge 1A of releasing ten such defendants
would be: four times he would suffer a -50 dissatisfaction; six times
he would receive a +100 satisfaction; and he would thus average a
+40 expected value from releasing our hypothetical defendant.
Likewise, the expected values for Judge 1A of holding ten such
defendants would be: four times he would receive a +75 satisfaction; six times he would suffer a -100 dissatisfaction; and he would
5. Judge 1A is more oriented toward avoiding a type 1 error than a type 2 error, whereas
Judge 2A is more oriented toward avoiding a type 2 error than a type 1 error. A type 1 error
involves rejecting a true hypothesis, whereas a type 2 error involves accepting a false hypothesis. The basic criminal justice system hypothesis or presumption is that the defendant is
innocent and that he will appear in court. Rejecting that hypothesis when it is true (a type 1
error) means holding a defendant who would have appeared. Accepting that hypothesis when
it is false (a type 2 error) means releasing a defendant who should have been held.
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thus average a -30 expected value from holding our hypothetical
defendant, assuming in both the releasing and holding situation
that he could be made aware of the consequences of his actions. The
same kind of expected value calculations could be done with Judge
lB. In general, an expected value is the benefits or costs associated
with an action or decision discounted by or multiplied by the probability that the benefits or costs will occur.
Given the logical assumption that any judge or any person will
prefer to choose the action or alternative decision that gives him the
highest expected value, Judge 1A will logically prefer to release the
hypothetical defendant with a probability of appearing of .60, and
Judge 1B will prefer to hold such a hypothetical defendant. Rather
then ask whether a given judge will release or hold a given defendant, the more interesting question is what is the threshold probability of appearance (PA*) that has to be met before Judge 1A or
1B will release a defendant. To calculate PA* for either judge, all

we have to do is solve for PA in the equation (1-PA)(a) + (PA)(b)
= (1-PA)(c) + (PA)(d) since at that PA level, the expected value
of releasing exactly equals the expected value of holding.' Thus, for
Judge 1A, his PA* or threshold probability of appearance equals
.385; whereas for Judge 1B, his PA* equals .851. This means Judge
1A will release (or should release if he wants to maximize his expected values) any defendant who has a .39 or higher chance of
appearing, and will hold any defendant who has a .38 or lower
chance of appearing. On the other hand, Judge 1B will release (or
should release if he wants to maximize his expected values) any
defendant who has a .86 or higher chance of appearing, and will hold
6. If one solves for PA in the equation which equalizes the expected value of releasing
and the expected value of holding, then the solution is PA* = (a-c)/(a-b-c+d). The
symbol PA is shown with a star to indicate this is the value of the probability of appearing
when the expected values of releasing and holding are equal. The proof of this formula is as
follows:
1. (1-PA)(a) + (PA)(b) = (1-PA)(c) + (PA)(d)
2. a-Pa + Pb = c-Pa + Pd
(Removing the parentheses, and substituting P for PA)
3. -Pa+Pb+Pc-Pd = c-a
(Transposing)
4. P(-a+b+c-d) = c-a
(Factoring out P)
5. P = (c-a)/(-a+b+c-d)
(Dividing both sides by a+b+c-d)
6. PA* = (a-c)/(a-b-c+d)
(Multiplying numerator and denominator of right side by -1)
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any defendant who has a .85 or lower chance of appearing. Judge
1A probably releases a substantially higher percentage of the defendants who appear before him than Judge 1B does if their judicial behavior reflects their differential values and they face roughly
the same defendants.
2.

APPLICATIONS AND VARIATIONS

Actual judges could be positioned with regard to their orientation toward avoiding type 1 errors versus avoiding type 2 errors by
calculating for each judge what his threshold or equilibrium PA* is.
The higher his PA* is, the more he is oriented toward holding defendants. To obtain the values of judges for insertion into matrices
like those shown in Figure 1 would involve asking them questions
like those shown in Figure 2. The questions are in a form that facilitates mailed responses although they also could be administered in
person. Asking judges directly as to what probability of appearance
they require in order to release a defendant is likely to yield less
reliable responses than this more indirect approach, although both
approaches can be used.' The questionnaire can also contain other
questions relating to the bond setting process including hypothetical
bond-setting situations as described below in Section lB.
Instead of having both an upper anchor at +100 and a lower
anchor at -100, one might use just an upper anchor at +100 or just
a lower anchor at -100. Doing so allows more freedom at the other
end of the scale rather than sometimes artificially saying that the
worst payoff has the same value as the best payoff but is opposite
in sign. The worst payoff, however, is the same as the best payoff
but opposite in sign if a judge says the cost of a type 1 error (of
holding a defendant who would show up) is the holding costs incurred minus the releasing costs saved, and the cost of a type 2 error
(of releasing a defendant who fails to show) is the releasing costs
incurred minus the holding costs saved. It would not generally be
meaningful to assign the worst payoff a value of zero because doing
so might result in the next to the worst payoff having a positive
7. On various methodologies for obtaining payoff matrix data, see Huber, Methods for
Quantifying Subjective Probabilitiesand Multi-Attribute Utilities, 5 DECISION SCIENCES 430
(1974); and P. KOTLER, MARKErING DECISION MAKING: A MODEL BUILDING APPROACH 583-95
(1971).
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SOME QUESTIONS FOR OBTAINING A JUDGE'S VALUES
REGARDING PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS

Cener*al. atemevif Thore are two things that could happen if you release somein court when he is supposed to (possibility a) ;
the other is that he will fail to appear in court when he is supposed to (possibility b). There are likewise two things that could have happened when you hold
someone in jail. One is that he would have appeared in court if he had been
released (possibility c); the other is that he would have failed to appear if he
had been released (possibility d).
one. One is that he will appear

Question
1.

2.

Which of these four possibilities would give you the most
satisfaction? Let's score this one +100 to have an upper
anchor point.

(a, b, c, or d)

Which of these four possibilities would give you the most
dissatisfaction? Let's score this one -100 to have a lower
anchor point.

(a, b, c, or d)

3. Which of these four possibilities would give you the next to
the most satisfaction?
4.

Response

(a, b, c, or d)

In view of the satisfaction you receive from the most satisfying occurrence, how would you rate this next most satisfy- (a number from
ing occurrence on a scale from 0 to +100, where 0 means
0 to +100)
neutral, and ±100 means most satisfying?

5. Which of these four possibilities would give you the next to
the most dissatisfaction?

(a, b, c, or d)

6. In view of the dissatisfaction you receive from the most dissatisfying occurrence, how would you rate this next most (a number from
dissatisfying occurrence on a scale from 0 to -100, where
0 to -100)
0 means neutral, and -100 means most dissatisfying?
7.

Are you sure you want your next to the best choice to be
that close or that far away from the best choice, and that (possible revised
close or that far away from the neutral position? If not,
number for
please revise your answer accordingly,
question 4)

8.

Are you also sure you want your next to the worst choice
to be as close or as far away from your worst choice as you (possible revised
initially put it? If not, please revise that evaluation accordnumber for
ingly.
question 6)

value even though it is an undesirable payoff in an absolute as well
8
as a relative sense.
8. As a variation on Figure 2, instead of beginning by asking which of the four alternatives would give the most satisfaction, the questions can begin by saying "Which of these four
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As an alternative to the set of questions shown in Figure 2 which
some respondents may find difficult to handle because of the abstract nature of the numbers and the sometimes undesirable tendency to make the worst payoff the same as the best payoff but
opposite in sign, one can talk in terms of dollars willing to be paid
for each result. Thus, each judge would be asked, how much money
would you be willing to pay out of your own pocket in order to avoid
whatever hurt you might feel if a defendant you release fails to
appear in court (possibility a)? Likewise, how much would you be
willing to pay in order to be assured that a defendant you release
will appear in court (possibility b)? How much in order to be assured that the defendant you hold would have failed to appear in
court (possibility c)? Finally, how much would you be willing to pay
in order to avoid the hurt of knowing that the defendant you hold
would have appeared in court if he had been released (possibility
alternatives would give you some satisfaction, and which would give you some
dissatisfaction?" Then the questions can ask, "Of the satisfying alternatives, which is the
most satisfying?" the questionnaire could then determine a numerical value for the second
most satisfying as Figure 2 does. Then one would ask, "Of the dissatisfying alternatives,
which is the most dissatisfying?", and then likewise determine a numerical value for the
second most dissatisfying. That procedure in effect partitions the decisions the respondent
has to make into smaller more manageable decisions of determining direction, rank within
direction, and then relative numerical value for the lesser rank, rather than trying to determine the most satisfying alternative first which is a question that combines both direction
and rank. The respondent might also be more comfortable discussing the dissatisfying alternatives before the satisfying since people may tend to think more in terms of avoiding relatively bad errors in making decisions than in trying to maximize good results. In terms of
Figure 1, these questions involve determining: (1) where to put a minus and where to put a
plus; (2) which minus should be a double minus, and which plus should be a double plus;
(3) how the single minus should be scored if the double minus is scored -100; and (4) how
the single plus should be scored if the double plus is scored +100.
Another approach that has been used to assign payoff values to the alternative possibilities stemming from a decision theory problem is: (1) rank the payoffs from the most desirable
to the least desirable; (2) determine the relative distances between each payoff; (3) assign a
value of 100 to the most desirable and a value of 0 to the least desirable; (4) determine which
one of the payoff outcomes has close to an indifferent value, meaning it produces neither
satisfaction nor dissatisfaction; (5) subtract the numerical value of that indifferent payoff
from each of the other numerical values, giving positive values to payoffs above the indifferent
payoff and negative values to those below. This method is used by R. Tanter, Evaluation and
Anticipation of Choice in International Crisis Management (1975) (unpublished paper available from the author at the University of Michigan Political Science Department). The
results, however, become distorted if step 4 does not involve a truly indifferent payoff. Step
2 is difficult to execute if more than a pair of payoffs are being compared at once. Tanter
also asks respondents to rank and distance the payoffs on separate dimensions rather than
just on a dimension of overall satisfaction. He then weights the dimensions and combines the
data through a form of geometric scaling.
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d)?' The positive and negative signs would be the same as in figures
1A and 1B, but subjective monetary amounts would appear in the
cells. This method may be all right for determining the relative
distances between each payoff for a given judge, but it is not meaningful for making comparisons across judges because the amount of
money a judge is willing to payto avoid a dissatisfying alternative
or to receive a satisfying one is partly dependent on how much a
dollar is worth to him as well as how much dissatisfaction or satisfaction he feels from various outcomes. The idea of personally paying something no matter how small to avoid dissatisfaction or receive satisfaction may also seem too unrealistic for a judge to think
about, although the approach may be made more manageable if the
most satisfying alternative is automatically valued at $10 in order
to provide a base line.
Another alternative to the type of questions posed in Figure 2
is simply to ask two questions instead of eight in order to arrive at
a judge's threshold probability for cases in general or for a specific
type of hypothetical case. The two questions would be as follows:
1. If you set a bond that releases a defendant prior to trial,
he might subsequently fail to appear in court. This is undesirable
result B. If you set a bond that holds a defendant prior to trial,
he might have appeared in court if he would have been released.
This is undesirable result A. Which of those two undesirable results would you consider more undesirable in the average case?
A or B?
2. If we anchor. the more undesirable of those two results at
a minus 100 on a scale that goes from minus 100 to zero, then
approximately where would you position the result that is not the
more undesirable of the two? In other words, what relative number from -100 to 0 would you assign to B if you thought A was
more undesirable, or to A if you thought B was more undesirable?
With those two items of information, we can now determine the
9. As an alternative based on these four questions, the judge might find it helpful to
indicate first which possibility is the most satisfying, most dissatisfying, next to the most
satisfying, and next to the most dissatisfying. He would then be asked, how many dollars of
your own money would you be willing to pay to avoid the most dissatisfying possibility, to
avoid the next most dissatisfying possibility, to receive the satisfaction of the most satisfying
possibility, and to receive the satisfaction of the next to the most satisfying possibility? That
two-stage approach (with four sub-parts to each stage) probably makes the evaluations easier
although it does sometimes mean referring back to one's answers from the first stage in order
to answer the second stage questions.

19771

DECISION THEORY

1445

judge's threshold probability. Suppose, for example, the judge was
William Blackstone who said that it is ten times as bad to convict
an innocent person (a type A undesirable result) as it is to acquit a
guilty person (a type B undesirable result).'0 Suppose further that
Mr. Blackstone applied the same rule to holding and releasing in
pre-trial release decisions. He would then in effect be saying that a
type A result is worth 100 points on an undesirability scale and a
type B result is worth 10 points on the same undesirabiliy scale."
Thus Mr. Blackstone would have a threshold probability of 10/(100
+ 10) or .09, meaning he would release any defendant who has an
appearance probability better than .09 and hold any defendant who
has a probability less than .09. That .09 decision rule would in effect
enable Mr. Blackstone to maximize his net satisfaction or expected
values in his pre-trial release decision-making.' 2 The advantage of
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358.
11. Since Blackstone and others tend to express the relative undesirability of a type 1
error to a type 2 error as a ratio, the questions in either the four-alternative form or the twoalternative form should probably also do so. This would involve, for example, wording the
second question in the two-alternative form to read as follows:
2. How many more times as bad is result A over result B? (This assumes A
was the more undesirable of the two results. Reverse the wording if B was mentioned as the more undesirable result.) In other words, is result A twice as bad as
result B, five times as bad, ten times as bad, or is A some other multiple as bad
as B?
The researcher can then give the more undesirable result a score of -100 and the less
undesirable result a score of -100/M where M is the multiple indicating how many times
more undesirable the worse alternative is compared to the less worse one. For example, if the
respondent says it is five times as bad to have result A as result B, then he is in effect saying
result A gets a score of -100 and B gets a score of -100/5, or -20. He is also in effect saying
that his threshold probability is 20/(100+20), or .17.
12. The above approach assumes that a logically consistent decision maker would get
an amount of satisfaction from avoiding a type 1 error equal to the amount of dissatisfaction

from making a type 1 error. This

means if the value of cell d in Figure 1 is found to be equal

to -A, then the value of cell b is assumed to be equal to 4-A. Likewise, the above approach
assumes that a logically consistent decision maker would get an amount of satisfaction from
avoiding a type 2 error equal to the amount of dissatisfaction from making a type 2 error.
This means that if the value of cell a in Figure 1 is found to be equal to -B, then the value
of cell c is assumed to be equal to +B. Therefore, under the above approach, the expected
value of releasing equals (+A) (PA) + (-B)(1-PA), and the expected value of holding equals
(-A)(PA) + (+B)(1-PA). To find the threshold probability for a given judge involves
setting those two expressions equal to each other and solving for PA. The result will be the
equivalent of the algebraically simplified formula PA* = B/(A+B). It is also the equivalent
of solving for PA in the formula previously given of (1-PA)(a) + (PA)b = (1-PA)(c) +
(PA)(d) by substituting d, b, a, and c, for -A, +A, -B, and +B respectively.
An even simpler approach to determining one's threshold probability would be to use the
formula PA* = 1/(X+1), where X = A/B. This approach merely involves determining the
ratio between the amount of dissatisfaction from a type 1 error versus a type 2 error. It does
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this alternative is that it is simpler. Its disadvantage is that the
respondent can thereby more easily see what he thinks are the socially acceptable answers and thus give those answers rather than
his true attitudes.
One purpose for obtaining data like that asked for in Figure 2
would be to determine what kinds of background or attitudinal
characteristics correlate with being a holding- or a releasingoriented judge. That kind of information could be helpful in enabling persons involved in the judicial selection process to choose
judges whom they consider as having a more appropriate or balanced orientation. Another purpose might be to provide the judges
from a given court system with an analysis of how they stand on this
pre-trial release dimension relative to their fellow judges so that
they can decrease their releasing or holding orientation in order to
come closer to the average judge in their system, or to come closer
to a threshold of .50 or other threshold that might be considered
desirable. Such a use would be analogous to informing the judges
in a given court system how they compare in sentencing with the
average judge in their system as is sometimes done among judges
in order to produce more uniformity in their sentencing practices.
This uniformity-producing use of payoff matrices data logically
raises the question as to the desirability of seeking uniformity
among judges with regard to any PA* level or threshold probability
of appearance other than .50. One might argue that if a defendant
has a better than a .50 chance of appearing in court, then he should
always be released; and if he has less than a .50 chance of appearing
in court, then he should be held in jail pending a speedy trial. As
previously implied, however, that reasoning may ignore the severity
of the defendant's behavior and his likelihood of recommitting his
crime before he is tried and sentenced, and it may ignore the relation within the court system between the cost of holding an average
not require determining the values of A and B but only the value of A/B. If that value is 10,
as with Blackstone's standard for guilt, then PA* = 1/(10+1) = 1/11 = .09. That approach is
probably the best approach for determining one's own threshold probability because of its
simplicity, but it may not be a good approach to use in a questionnaire directed to judges or
others because the respondents can too easily see what is involved, and thereby give answers
that they think are socially desirable rather than their true answers. The approaches which
seek values for A and B, or for a, b,c, and d are somewhat more complicated and timeconsuming, but those defects may be more than offset by the increased subtlety and validity
of those approaches. One can prove algebraically that 1/(X+1) is the equivalent of B/(A+B)
and (a-c)/(a-b-c+d) given the definitions of these symbols.
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defendant in jail and the cost of rearresting a released defendant. If
the holding cost is substantially greater than the rearrest cost, then
the system should be willing to release an average defendant even
if his probability of appearing is substantially less than .50. Likewise, if the releasing cost is substantially greater than the average
holding cost, then the system should be willing to hold an average
defendant even if his probability of appearing might be greater than
.50. State statutes specifying prerelease procedures normally allow
discretion to deviate from a .50 figure, especially in view of the
difficulty of determining what figure a judge is operating under.' 3
There is no way of determining the PA* threshold that a judge
is using simply by observing his behavior. For example, if a judge
releases 50 percent of two defendants, that judge may be operating
at a .75 threshold level since he may have perceived one of the
defendants as being above the .75 level and one as being below. On
the other hand, that judge may be operating at a .25 level since he
may have perceived one of the defendants as being above the .25
level and one as being below. In other words, by observing the percentage of defendants a judge releases, we cannot tell what his
threshold probability-of-appearing criterion is unless we know what
he perceived the probability of appearance figure to be for each of
those defendants. If we had that information, we could observe
above what PA figure he begins to release and below what figure
(that is, the same figure unless there is a gray area) he begins to
hold. With that information, we could assign each judge a behavioral PA* figure rather than just an attitudinal PA* figure which the
questionnaire in Figure 2 generates although one's behavior generally follows one's attitudes."
13. In order for a judge to have a .50 threshold PA* with +100 and -100 anchor points
in the payoff cells, he would have to have the values of -100, + 100, + 100, and -100 in cells
a, b, c, and d. No other combination of values could yield a .50 PA* with +100 and -100
anchor points except having all four cells be +100 or all four cells be -100, but it would be
psychologically inconsistent for all four cells to be equally satisfying or equally unsatisfying.
If having all judges operating with a .50 PA* were deemed desirable, then it would make sense
to try to convince them that it is equally desirable to hold a defendant who would fail to
appear in court as it would be to release a defendant who would appear in court. It would
also then make sense to try to convince them that it is equally undesirable to release a
defendant who had failed to appear in court as it would be to hold a defendant who would
have appeared in court.
14. It might be difficult to devise a meaningful questionnaire or interviewing approach
to determine in actual cases what a judge perceives the probability of appearing to be. This
is so because it is quite possible that judges tend to reach an overall or holistic decision on
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If we knew what a given judge perceived the probability of
appearance figure to be for each defendant, then we might find that
above a certain PA figure, he releases most, but not all defendants;
and below that figure, he holds most, but not all defendants even
though that figure is the one that involves the least inconsistencies.
Those inconsistencies, however, may simply reflect the fact that the
judge is not considering just one contingent event in making his
release-hold decision. A second contingent event that he might be
considering is the probability that the defendant may commit a
crime while released although under most statutes, the probability
of appearing in court is supposed to be the main or even exclusive
criterion for releasing or holding defendants prior to trial. We could
prepare a payoff matrix like those shown in Figure 1 in order to
indicate how a given judge or type of judge feels in a given case or
type of case about releasing or holding a defendant in light of the
probability that he might commit a certain type of crime while
released. From that four-celled matrix we could obtain for the judge
a threshold PN* where PN stands for the probability of not committing a serious crime. For a defendant to be released under this multiple contingency perspective, he would have to have a probability of
appearing greater than PA* and a probability of not committing a
crime greater than PN*. If the defendant flunks either test, he does
not get released.

3.

MONETARY VALUES

One might ask how can the above multiple contingency approach take into consideration that more weight is supposed to be
given to the probability of appearing in court than to the probability
of committing a crime. This is difficult to do under the nonwhether to hold or release without making a determination (especially an explicit determination) of a defendant's probability of appearing. If judges were asked to write down what they
perceived the PA to be in each case, they might have a tendency to say less than .50 where
they had set a bond that resulted in holding the defendant and greater than .50 where they
had set a bond that resulted in releasing the defendant. Perhaps some judges might be willing
to record their perceived PA figures after observing and questioning the defendant, but before
setting bond. This would be analogous to the cooperation the University of Chicago Jury
Project received whereby judges agreed to indicate how they would decide a jury trial criminal
case after the end of the evidence and the arguments, but before the jury reached its decision.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 45-54 (1966). Another alternative research approach would be to present the judges with hypothetical situations like those discussed with
regard to Figure 6 and ask them what they would estimate the probability of appearing to be
in each situation given the information available.
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monetary approach, partly because a -100 in the crime:
committing payoff matrix is treated as being as undesirable as a
-100 in the court-appearing matrix. Likewise, the non-monetary
approach would treat a -100 in a payoff matrix dealing with murder crime-committing as being as undesirable as a -100 in a payoff
matrix dealing with a sub0tantially lesser crime. What we need is a
common measurement unit for showing values across payoff matrices regardless of the contingent event with which we are dealing.
Ideally, such a unit measures psychological utility, but that kind of
unit is too difficult to express. As a substitute, we can at least
tentatively try working with dollars.
Figure 3 shows a decision theory payoff matrix involving two
contingent events and monetary values. The two contingent events
are (1) appearing or failing to appear in court, and (2) committing
or not committing a crime while released. The monetary values
include two releasing costs and three holding costs. The releasing
costs are (1) the cost of rearresting an average defendant, estimated
at $200, and (2) the cost of a crime committed by an average defendant while released, estimated at $1,000. The holding cost consists
of (1) the maintenance cost for keeping an average defendant in jail
for an average pre-trial time period, figured at $4.43 per day for 2.28
months, (2) the lost gross national product for an average defendant, figured at $360 per month for 2.28 months, and (3) the bitterness cost that society might be willing to spend in order to avoid
having a defendant sit in jail prior to trial for an average 2.28
months and then be found not guilty, estimated at $300 per month
given that 12 percent of the defendants held in jail prior to trial are
found not guilty. 5 Those figures come from a survey of police chiefs,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and bail administration officials in
a sample of 23 cities, analyzed in more detail in another study."6 The
two releasing costs are symbolized RC, and RC2 respectively in
Figure 3A, and the three holding costs are collectively symbolized
HC. Costs are shown as negative amounts, and benefits are shown
as positive amounts. Releasing benefits (RB) are holding costs
saved, and holding benefits (HBI and HB2 ) are releasing costs saved.
15. Given the above figures, the average holding cost per defendant held is $1,206. Of
that total, $303 is jail maintenance cost ($4.43 per day, times 30 days, times 2.28 months);
$821 is lost gross national product ($360 per month, times 2.28 months); and $82 is bitterness
cost ($300 per month, times 2.28 months, times 12 percent).
16. S. NAGEL, P. WICE, & M. NEEF, THE POLICY PROBLEM OF DOING Too MUCH OR Too
LITTLE: PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AS A CASE IN POINT (1976).
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FIGURE 3. DECISION-THEORY PAYOFF MATRICES INVOLVING TWO
CONTINGENT EVENTS AND MONETARY VALUES
3A.

RELEASING AND HOLDING COSTS
Alternative Possibilitieswith Point Probabilities
(D)

(A)

(B)

Would
Fail to Appear
& Commit Crime

Would
Appear
& Commit Crime

Would
Fail to Appear
& No Crime

Would
Appear
& No Crime

.08 X .15 = .01

.92 X .15 = .!4

.08 X .85 = .07

.92 X .85 -

RB

= +1,206

RB

±1,206

RC

=

RC

m-1,000

1

-200

RC 2

-1,000

HC

-1,206

2

$6

HB
HB

2

.

HB

= -1,206
-+1,000

2

=-

RB

- +1,206

HC

---

200

$1,006
- -1,206

HC
HB

$1,206
1,206

+200

I

+1000
-$6

3B.

= +1,206

RC I

$206
HC

+200

RB

.78

-$206

-$1,006

-$1,206

EXPECTED VALUES
Alternative Possibilitieswith Range Probabilities

Would Fail
to Appear &
Commit
Crime
.00 to .08

Would
Appear &
Commit
Crime

Would Fail
to Appear &
No Crime

Would Appear
& No Crime

,07 to .15

.00 to .08

.77 to .85

$.06

$29

0 to .48

14 to 31

to -. 48

0 to 80

-$29

-$.06
-0

$70

-14

to -31

$941
(i.e., $1,206 x .78)
929 to 1025
(i.e., $1,206 x .77,
etc.)

-$70
-0

to -80

Total
Expected
Value

$1,040
943 to 1,136

-$941
-929

to -1025

-$1,040
-943

to -1,136

The same questionnaire data from which most of the cost figures were obtained also indicated that 92 percent of the released
defendants appeared in court, and 85 percent of the released de-
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fendants were not known to have committed a crime while released.17 Given that there are two contingent events, there are four
possible occurrences which are labeled A, B, C, and D in Figure 3A.
To determine the probability that a released defendant would both
appear in court and not commit a crime, we could simply multiply
the .92 by the .85 if we are willing to assume that those two subpossibilities are independent of each other. We know, however, that
they are not likely to be completely independent of each other because defendants with certain characteristics are likely to both appear and not commit crimes, whereas defendants with opposite
characteristics are more likely to both fail to appear and to commit
crimes. Even though we do not know how closely related our two
contingent events are, we can from the data we have determine a
maximum and a minimum probability somewhere between .00 and
1.00 for the A, B, C, and D alternative possibilities. This is done in
Figure 4. For example, if possibilities A-and C must constitute 92
percent of our released defendants (since those two possibilities constitute all the defendants who appear and only the defendants who
17. Just because 92 percent of the released defendants appear in court does not mean
that 92 percent of all the defendants would appear in court since the 27 out of 100 defendants
who are held do not get an opportunity to fail to appear. Assuming their failure rate is about
double the 8 percent rate for those who are released, this means that if all the defendants
were released, then the 92 percent appearance rate would drop to 90 percent. This figure is
arrived at by weighting the .92 appearance rate by the fact that it covers .73 of the defendants,
and by weighting the .84 appearance rate (i.e., 100 percent minus 16 percent) by the fact that
it covers .27 of the defendants. In other words, the new .90 appearance rate equals (.73)(.92)
+ (.27)(.84). If we assume the failure rate for the detainees is triple the rate for those released,
then we would calculate (.73)(.92) + (.27)(.76) which yields an appearance rate of .88. If we
go so far as to assume none of the detainees would appear if released, then the overall
appearance rate would still be .67 or two-thirds since (.73)(.92) + (.27)(0) = .67.
The reason the appearance rate is not drastically changed by figuring in those who are
not released is because (1) almost three-fourths of the defendants are released, (2) only a low
8 percent are known to fail to appear, and (3) because many defendants who are not released
may be good risks but they lack the funds to pay the bond or they are possibly misperceived
as being bad risks. Thus with this data, each doubling of the failure to appear rate of those
not released only results in a reduction of 2 percent in the general appearance rate since .73
times .08 is .02. Even if a substantially lowered appearance rate figure were used, the general
conclusions of this section would not be changed that the expected value of releasing the
average defendant is substantially greater than the expected value of holding the average
defendant. Another useful aspect of this kind of analysis is that one can easily change the
probabilities (or the costs) and see how the results would change with regard to which of the
alternative decisions is the best decision in benefit-cost terms, as in note 23 infra. The same
above considerations apply to the .85 tentative probability which is used to indicate the
percent of the released defendants who are not known to have committed a crime while
released.
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appear), then that equality alone indicates that either possibility A
or possibility C (but not both) can have a maximum probability of
.92. The second equality tells us, however, that possibility A can be
no higher than .85 and not .92. Applying that same reasoning to A,
B, C, and D in Figure 4A, we can then take those four maximum
probabilities and the four equalities to Figure 4B to determine what
the minimum probabilities have to be. Thus, A could not be lower
than .77. Otherwise, A + C could not add up to .92, since .15 is as
high as C can be. "
Now that we have that cost and proability data, what do we do
with it? That is where Figure 3B comes in. The logical thing to do
is to determine for each of the four alternative possibilities what the
expected values are for releasing or holding this hypothetical average defendant. The expected value for any one of the eight cells in
our payoff matrix is the total value or cost of that cell times the
probability that the combination of contingent events will occur
18. If we had 100 cases of defendants who were released, the following four-cell table
would be consistent with our data that shows 92 percent of the released defendants appear
in court and 85 percent of the released defendants do not commit crimes.
APPEARANCE
Fail

CRIME-

No
Crime

5

Crime

3

COMMITTING

Appear
B

80

D

8

A

85

C
12

15

92
100 cases
With that hypothetical data, the probabilities of occurrences A, B, C, and D are .80, .05, .12,
and .03 respectively, all of which are consistent with the ranges given in Figure 3B. These
are referred to as empirical combined probabilities, rather than empirical single probabilities
like the .92 probability of appearing, or a prioricombined probabilities like the .92 times .85
probability of appearing and not committing a crime. With that hypothetical data, one can
also say that if a defendant appears, the probability that he did not commit a crime is 80/92
or .87. Likewise, if a defendant does not commit a crime, the probability that he will appear
is 80/85 or .94. Knowing any one of the four categories on the columns or rows, we can give a
probability for any of the other categories. These are referred to as conditional or Bayesian
probabilities. If we know with 1.00 accuracy that a defendant failed to appear, then we know
of course that there is a zero probability that he appeared since those are complimentary
probabilities.
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FIGURE 4.

4A.

DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PROBABILITY FOR
EACH CONTINGENT POSSIBILITY WITH TWO CONTINGENT EVENTS

DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM PROBABILITY FOR EACH POSSIBILITY

Given this
Equality

Then
Max D is

Then
Max C is

Then
Max B is

Then
Max A is

A + C = .92

X

.92

X

.92

A + B = .85

X

X

.85

.85

C + D= .15

.15

.15

X

X

B + D =.08

.08

X

.08

X

(The lowest maximum for each possibility is underlined.)

4B.

DETERMINING THE MINIMUM
BILITY

Given this
Equality
and the Above
Maximums

PROBABILITY FOR EACH POSS1-

Then
Min D is

Then
Min C is

A + C

.92

X

.07
(i.e., .92-.85)

A + B

.85

X

X

C + D

.15

.00
(i.e., .15-.15)

.07
(i.e.,.15-.08)

B + D - .08

.00
(i.e., .08-.08)

x

Then
Min B is

Then
Min A is
.77
(i.e., .92-.15)

.00
(i.e., .85-.85)

.77
(i.e.,.85-.08)

X
.00

(i.e., .087.08)

X

(An X means the equality does not apply.)

which that cell represents. Thus, the expected value for releasing an
average defendant who would fail to appear and not commit a crime
(possibility B) is $70. That figure represents the RB + RC, sum (or
$1,006) multiplied by the .07 probability. If one rejects the above
independent probability approach for handling two contingent
events, one can say the expected value is from $0 to $80. That range
represents the RB + RC, sum multiplied by the .00 minimum probability, and the RB + RC, sum multiplied by the .08 maximum
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probability for alternative possibility B."5
After we have obtained expected values for each payoff cell, the
next logical thing to do is to sum the expected values across each
row in order to obtain the total expected value for releasing the
average defendant in order to compare that value with the total
expected value for holding the average defendant. Doing so with the
data given shows that our judicial system would maximize its
benefit-cost picture by releasing the average defendant. This is what
our judicial system does do, at least as indicated by the same questionnaire data from which the costs and probabilities were taken.
That data shows the average defendant has a .73 chance of being
released since the average city in the sample reported a 73 percent
release rate. Many defendants, however, are not average defendants
which possibly explains why 27 percent of the defendants are held
in jail pending trial. Perhaps the judges in those specific cases implicitly perceive the probability of appearing, the probability of
crime committing, the releasing costs, and the holding costs to be
such that the expected value of holding those defendants is greater
than the expected value of releasing them rather than the more
common reverse order.' Perhaps some of those cases also involve
other contingent events (like the probability that a defendant al19. Essentially the same information presented by the eight-cell tables of Figure 3 could
be presented by a decision tree that ends in eight branches. It begins with the decision fork
of releasing or holding, with each of those two forks going into an appearing versus a failingto-appear fork, and each of those forks going into a no-crime versus a crime fork. A decision
tree approach, however, consumes more space to present, conveys less detail, contains more
repetitive labels, has extra arithmetic steps by not working with combined probabilities, and
is probably not so easy to read. A decision tree approach is also arbitrary in whether it
presents the appearance contingency before or after the crime-committing contingency since
they are not sequential events. The results, however, should be identical between the tabular
approach and the decision tree approach since the two approaches are basically just different
methods of visual presentation, not differences in substance.
20. Prediction techniques which consider the characteristics of the defendant and his
crime can be useful in predicting his probabilities and costs. The most widely known prediction scheme for predicting the probability of appearing was developed by the Vera Institute
in New York City. See Ares, supra note 2. For predicting the probability of crime-committing
while released, see J. Locke, supra note 3. On the use of subjective probabilities rather than
probabilities based on statistical data, see Huber, supra note 7, and KOTLER, supra note 7.
On the use of statistical techniques for arriving at probabilities, see S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL
PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 144-72 (1969); and D. FINNEY, PROaIw ANALYSIS
(1971). For a recent example of the application of probit analysis (which involves using
statistical techniques to arrive at probabilities), Warren Hausman and Richard Thaler of the
University of Rochester School of Management have been experimenting with the application
of probit analysis for obtaining pre-trial release prediction probabilities.
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though "guilty" will be acquitted) or other costs (like the opportunity cost of not taking advantage of the opportunity of holding a
defendant in order to teach him and others a lesson not to get
arrested).
The decision rule generated by an analysis of Figure 3 is: Release a defendant when the expected value of releasing him given
his specific probabilities and costs is greater than the expected
value of holding him. An alternative way of conceptualizing the
release-hold decision would be to say: Release the defendant if the
expected holding costs are greater than the expected releasing costs.
The expected holding costs for our hypothetical average defendant
are $1,206 or HC, assuming, he is held. The expected releasing costs
are (PF)(RC,) + (PC)(RC2 ) where PF is the probability of failing
to appear (i.e., 1.00 - PA) and PC is the probability of committing
a crime while released (i.e., 1.00 - PN). The expected releasing
costs are thus (.08)($200) + (.15)($1,000), or $16 + $150, or $166.

That alternative conceptualizing could also be stated as: Release
the defendant if the expected releasing benefits are greater than the
expected holding benefits. Given the data, the expected releasing
benefits for the average defendant would be $1,206 saved, and the
expected holding benefits for the average defendant would be $166
saved. 2 We can also combine those two alternative conceptions by
saying release the defendant if releasing benefits minus releasing
costs (i.e., $1,206 minus $166) is greater than holding benefits minus
holding costs (i.e., $166 minus $1,206). In other words, the $1,040
expected value of releasing for the average defendant is greater than
the -$1,040 expected value of holding." Either the expected value
21. It is not meaningful to say that someone released who appears in court without
committing a crime has provided the system with $200 in benefits by not having to be
rearrested or with $1,000 in benefits by not having committed a crime. All one can say is that
such a person has not caused the system to incur $200 in rearrest costs (RC,) and has not
caused the system to incur $1,000 in crime-committing costs (RC).
22. A related conclusion is reached in Friedman, The Evolution of a Bail Reform, 7
POLICY SCIENCEs 281 (1976). In his appendix, Friedman shows that the benefits of releasing
on recognizance are greater than the costs of releasing on recognizance, at least in New York
City. He does not do so by working with monetary values for all the benefits and costs
involved, but only for those that are relatively easy to assign a monetary value to. The only
holding cost he deals with is the jail maintenance cost which he figures at $3 a day for an
average of 30 days per defendant held. The only ROR releasing cost he deals with is the cost
of interviewing, verifying, and following up on released defendants which he figures at $45
per defendant released. Thus, the problem for him is whether $90 + V is greater than $45 +
.016C. The V represents the benefits from releasing other than the $90 saved in jail mainte-
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approach via the payoff matrix or the expected net benefit approach
(i.e., expected benefits minus expected costs) should yield the same
result which in this case is a decision in favor of releasing the average defendant prior to trial. 3
nance. The C represents the costs of releasing other than the $45 spent as par of the ROR
processing. The .016 indicates that those costs are only incurred in the 1.6 percent of the cases
where the ROR defendant fails to appear.
He establishes that $90 + V must be greater than $45 + .016C by the following steps:
(1) Since the average defendant is released rather than held, this means 90 + V
must be valued more than .04C, where .04 indicates that 4 percent of the released
defendants failed to appear (but not released ROR).
(2) Then C < 2,250 + 25V, by interchanging both sides of the inequality and
dividing both sides by .04.
(3) Then 45 + .016C < 45 + .016 (2,250 +25V), by substituting 2,250 + 25V as a
value greater than C.
(4) Then 45 + .016C < 81 + .4V, by simplifying the right side of the inequality
through the removal of the parentheses.
(5) Therefore, the costs of ROR (i.e., 45 + .016C) are less than the benefits of
ROR (i.e., 90 + 1V) since 81 + .4V is less than 90 + IV. If d < e and e < f, then d <
f and f> d.
In other words, what Friedman is basically saying is that society must consider releasing
to be more valuable than holding since society does more releasing than holding, and therefore
it must consider ROR to be more valuable than holding since ROR is a form of releasing that

has

a better appearance rate than releasing in general. The big defect in his analysis is that

he does not show that releasing or ROR is actually more profitable than holding, but rather
he only shows that society must perceive releasing or ROR as being more profitable if one
operates on the assumption that society or an individual decides in favor of the alternative
activity that is perceived to be the most profitable activity.
23. The same analysis based on Figures 3A and 3B and the above calculations could be
applied to determining the sensitivity of the outcome to changes in the inputs. In other words,
how much would the inputs have to be changed in order to reverse the decision from favoring
the release of the defendant to favoring his being held? More specifically, how much would
the .92 appearance rate have to drop before the expected value of releasing would fall below
the expected value of holding? If we were only concerned with one holding cost and one
releasing cost and only with the probability of appearing rather than the probability of crime
committing, then the formula for the expected value of releasing would be (1-PA)(RB-RC)
+ (PA)(RB). In other words, the value of cell a in Figure 1 is the releasing benefits minus
the releasing costs or RB-RC, and the value of cell b is RB as is shown below. Likewise, the
formula for the expected value of holding would be (1-PA)(HB-HC) + (PA)(HC), which
means the value of cell c in Figure 1 is HB-HC and the value of cell d is HC. Now all we
have to do to answer the above question (as to how low does PA have to drop to make the
expected value of holding greater than the expected value of releasing) is (1) substitute
monetary values for RB, RC, HB, and HC, (2) set those two formulas equal to each other,
and (3) solve for the value of PA. Any probability lower than that value would make it more
worthwhile to hold the defendant. Actually with the releasing and holding cost data for the
average defendant from Figure 3, it would always be more profitable to release such a defendant no matter how low the value of PA is. This is so because all the cell values on the
releasing row are higher than the corresponding cell values on the holding row which they
would not be if the holding costs were lower or the releasing costs were higher. By using the
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FIGURE 5.

DECISION. TREE INVOLVING TWO CONTINGENT EVENTS
AND MONETARY VALUES

Possibility
Benefits-Costs

EV#1A = (P 2 ) (A) + (l-P 2 ) (C)
EV#2A = (P 2 ) (A') + (1-P 2 ) (C')
EV#l
EV#2

-

EV#lB = (P2) (B) + (1-P 2 ) (D)
EV#2B = (P 2 ) (B') + (1-P 2 ) (D')

(P 1 ) (EV#IA) + (1-P

1

) (EV#lB)

(P 1 ) (EV#2A) + (1-P

1

) (EV#2B)

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1433

Another insight-generating way of analyzing the data which
was placed in Figure 3 is to use a decision tree perspective like that
shown in Figure 5. The left trunk end of the decision tree shows that
we are trying to determine the value of a decision to release versus
a decision to hold. Releasing can result in appearance or nonappearance and in no crime or a crime. Likewise, the held defendant

could have resulted in appearance or non-appearance and in no
crime or a crime if the defendant would have been released. At the
right end of each branch are given the A, B, C, or D possibilities
listed in Figure 3, along with the benefits minus costs from Figure
3. A prime sign is used to distinguish those possibilities for held
defendants versus released defendants. The expected value of any
branch that is not an end branch is equal to the sum of the values
data in Figure 3 and solving for PA* by the above approach or the formulas given in footnotes
6 or 12 one obtains a PA* that is negative but rounds off to zero which is the nearest possible
PA.
Fail to Appear
(1-PA)

Appear
(PA)

Release

RB-RC

RB

(1-PA)(RB-RC) + (PA)(RB)

Hold

HB-HC

HC

(1-PA)(HB-HC) + (PA)(HC)

Expected Value

One could similarly answer the question, how much would the holding costs have to
decrease (or the releasing costs have to increase) in order to make the expected value of
holding greater than the expected value of releasing? To answer that question about HC, one
would substitute numerical values for PA and RC. This would also give us the numerical
value of HB since holding benefits: are simply the positive sign of the minus releasing costs.
We could then use -X to label HC and X to label RB. The next step would be to set those
two formulas equal to each other as we previously did, but this time solve for X rather than
PA. If the holding costs decrease $1 below the value of X, then it is more worthwhile to hold
the defendant than to release him assuming everything else is held constant. With the partial
data from Figure 3, the value of X is only $16 since the expected value of releasing is
(.08)(X-200) + (.92)(X), and the expected value of holding is (.08)(-X+200) + (.92)-(X).
This means the holding cost would have to be drastically reduced (or the releasing cost
drastically raised) in general or in a specific case to make holding more worthwhile than
releasing if one only considers the probability and cost given of rearresting for nonappearance. One could easily extend the above sensitivity analysis (i.e., the sensitivity of the
result to changes in the inputs) by expanding the formulas to include more kinds of holding
and releasing costs and more kinds of contingent probabilities analogous to those in Figure
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of the subsequent branches discounted or multiplied by the probability of their occurring, as indicated by the equations given at the
bottom of the figure. Those calculations are referred to as folding
back because they involve working backwards from the values on
the horizontal end branches and the probabilities on the diagonal
branches to the expected values in the previous circles.
The decision tree shows that the expected value of releasing an
average defendant is substantially greater than the expected value
of holding one as was previously indicated. That result is not affected by whether the decision tree branches first on appearance
and then on crime-committing, or first on crime-committing and
then on appearance. That result, however, assumes that the probabilities of appearing and crime committing are not affected by
whether we release or hold someone. In other words, if an average
defendant has a .92 probability of appearing, we assume he would
have had that same probability of appearing if released regardless
whether he is actually released or held. Likewise, the model assumes
the benefits and costs are not affected by whether we hold someone.
In other words, if an average defendant who commits a crime while
released incurs $1,000 in social costs, he would incur the same $1,000
if he were to commit a crime while released regardless whether he
is released or held. A decision tree perspective can often be quite
helpful in analyzing decisions that involve more than one contingent
event, more than one decision-branching point, or more than
dichotomous branches.
B.

The Bond-Setting Decision

So far, we have been discussing the decision problem of just
whether to release or hold a defendant prior to trial. That, however,
is not the way the pretrial release problem is usually stated in the
courtroom context. In that context, the arraignment judge is usually
faced with the decision of what bond to set for the defendant rather
than the dichotomous decision of whether or not to release the defendant. Nevertheless, to a considerable extent, the bond-setting
decision can be reduced to a release-hold decision if one equates
"release" with a low bond (that is, a bond the defendant can and
will meet) and "hold" with a high bond (that is, a bond the defendant cannot or will not meet). If an arraignment judge wants to
release a defendant, but the defendant is unexpectedly unable to
meet the bond the judge has initially set, then the judge can lower
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it to arrive at a figure the defendant can meet. On the other hand,
if an arraignment judge wants to hold a defendant and he sets a very
high bond which the defendant unexpectedly can meet, then the
judge cannot so easily raise the bond without some evidence of
changed circumstances other than the circumstance that the defendant had more money than the judge thought he had.
One interesting aspect about the bond-setting decision as contrasted to the releasing decision is that the decision itself can influence the probability of appearing in court, which is supposed to be
the main criterion in arriving at the decision. Thus, a judge can
increase the probability of a defendant appearing in court by setting
a high bond, provided that the defendant can meet the bond. With
a high bond, the defendant has more of an incentive to appear in
order to retrieve his bond than he would with a low bond. A rational
way to combine the bond-setting decision with the decision to release or hold might involve a five-step process. First, the judge
involved can determine his own threshold probability of appearance
(PA*) through the payoff matrix approach we discussed in Section
II.A or through whatever method the judge prefers. Second, the
judge can determine whether the defendant's probability of appearing in court is greater than that threshold probability regardless of
the bond set. Third, if the defendant's PA is greater than PA*, then
the defendant can be released on his own recognizance or on a nominal bond. Fourth, if the defendant's PA is less than PA*, then the
bond should be set just high enough to bring the defendant's PA
above the threshold probability. Doing so involves the judge taking
into consideration the defendant's ability to pay since a low bond
will be more of an incentive for a poor person to appear in court than
a rich person.24 Fifth, if no bond can bring the defendant's probability of appearing above the threshold, then the defendant may have
to be held in jail pending a speedy trial. Likewise, if the bond that
24. Somewhat contrary to this rational scheme, however, is the fact that bond tends to
be set lower for non-indigent defendants than for indigent ones if we count release on recognizance as a zero bond. The median or middlemost bond for a nationwide sample of 246 indigent
defendants charged with grand larceny was $2,328, whereas the median bond for a similar
sample of 354 non-indigents was only $1,850. Further details are given in Nagel, Effects of
Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure Treatment, 48 IND. L.J. 404 (1973),
especially notes 15 and 28 and the accompanying text. That seeming discrepancy can, though,
be partly explained by the possible fact that non-indigent defendants have a greater probability of appearing in court than indigent defendants do, especially if there is no trial-day
notification system.
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can bring PA above PA* is too high for the defendant to meet, then
he may also have to be held while awaiting trial. It is unfortunate
when a defendant has to be held in jail pending trial given the fact
that the holding costs are usually higher than the releasing costs.
That fact, however, is implicitly taken into consideration in the
lowness of the threshold probability which the judge uses as his
criterion in determining which defendants to hold.
The bond-setting decision, like the releasing decision, can simultaneously consider the two contingent events of appearing in
court and not committing a crime while released. In that decision
situation, our five-step decision process would be adjusted as follows. First, the judge involved determines his PA* threshold with
the court-appearance contingency, and then his probability-of-notcommitting-a-crime threshold (PN*) with the crime-committing
contingency. Second, the judge determines whether the defendant's
probability of appearance is greater than PA*, and whether the
defendant's probability of not committing a crime (PN) is greater
than PN*. Third, if the defendant passes both tests, then he can be
released on his own recognizance or on a nominal bond. Fourth, the
judge can try to set a bond high enough to bring PA over PA*. Doing
so, however, may sometimes decrease PN since a high bond has
been known to motivate a defendant to commit a crime in order to
pay off the high bond loan or high bond premium. Fifth, the defendant may have to be detained in jail until his trial if step four does
not bring both his probabilities above the threshold cutoffs.
As an alternative to the above five-step process, a judge could
conceivably go through a kind of crude or implicit expected value
calculation with monetary values like those shown in Figure 3. The
only difference would be that instead of the alternative decisions
being release or hold, they would be (1) release on the highest bond
that the defendant can meet, or (2) hold. The probabilities, with
regard to appearing in court at the top of columns A and C would
thus be higher than if the choice were merely release or hold, and
the probabilities with regard to failing to appear at the top of columns B and D would be lower. All the other calculations would be
the same, and the defendant would be released if the expected value
of releasing (EVR) were greater than the expected value of holding
(EVH).
IPerhaps we should emphasize that we
are not saying that
judges do or should prepare payoff matrices for each arraignment
case. What we are saying is that the payoff matrix approach can
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provide an understanding of what may be implicitly happening in
an inexact way in a judge's mind. What we are also saying is that
the payoff matrix or decision theory approach can provide a means
for understanding the effects of various cost changes and probability
changes on releasing and bond-setting decisions. That approach,
when combined with a questionnaire or other data-gathering techniques, can also provide information relevant to encouraging more
uniformity or more compliance with appropriate legal standards in
releasing and bond-setting decisions.
A good set of questions to add to our Figure 1 questionnaire
might especially include some short hypothetical bond-setting problems. For example, the judges might be presented with 15 hypothetical defendants and asked to place each one in about a dozen bond
categories. Four such hypothetical case questions are shown in Figure 6. That particular set is designed to determine the extent to
which a responding judge is influenced by the severity of the crime
committed irrespective of its relation to the probability of the defendant's appearing in court. Judges will generally admit they set
bond higher for more severe crimes but not in order to punish the
defendant with pretrial detention, but rather in recognition of the
relation between crime severity and failure to appear in court."5 If a
judge gives a high bond in cases 4 and 7 and a low bond in cases 1
and 15, then he is more influenced by the probability of appearance
than by the charge. If a judge gives a high bond in cases 1 and 7
and a low bond in cases 4 and 15, then he is more influenced by the
charge than by the probability of appearance. If a judge is about
equally high or low in all four cases, then he is not influenced by
either the severity of the charge or PA. It might be interesting to
know what explains those different propensities among different
judges. It might also be interesting to point out their propensities
to them in an unpublicized way possibly as part of a judicial workshop to see if doing so might change their subsequent bond-setting
behavior in court. This questionnaire approach obviously works bet-

ter than directly asking a judge what his propensities are, and works
better than trying to determine his propensities from a mass of cases
in which the possibly influential variables cannot be separated out
or controlled for. Other hypothetical defendants can be included to
25. P. WiCE, supra note 4, at 25-34.
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get at the role of the probability of crime committing, the effect of
economic class, and to decrease the visibility to the respondent of
the comparisons that are likely to be made.
FIGURE 6.

SOME QUESTIONS FOR OBTAINING A JUDGE'S PROPENSITIES REGARDING BOND-SETTING DECISIONS

General Statement: Listed below are 15 defendants appearing before you in an
arraignment proceeding. For each defendant, indicate in what range you would
generally set bond for an average defendant having those characteristics. The
ranges we are using are as follows: (1) release on recognizance; (2) $0 to $99;
(3) $100 to $499; (4) $500 to $999; (5) $1,000 to $1,999; (6) $2,000 to $4,999;
(7) $5,000 to $9,999; (8) $10,000 to $19,999; (9) $20,000 to $49,999; (10) $50,000
to $99,999; (11) $100,000 or over; (12) no bond allowed.
Item #
1.

Probabilityof
Other
Appearing in Court Characteristics

Charge
Armed robbery

.90

Bond
Category

None available

(Indicate
category 1

to 12)
4.

Shoplifting

.20

Adult male

7.

Armed robbery

.15

None available

Shoplifting

.85

Adult male

15.

C.

Increasingthe Expected Value of Releasing in Individual Cases

1.

THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

In an arraignment proceeding, a judge must decide whether to
release the defendant on his own recognizance or by way of a low
bond, or whether to hold the defendant by refusing to set bond or
by way of a high bond. Judges are probably more reluctant to make
an error of releasing a defendant who would fail to appear (a type 2
error) than to make an error of holding a defendant who would
appear if released (a type 1 error). Releasing errors are more avoided
because they are more visible than holding errors since it is embarrassing to a judge if a defendant he released fails to appear, but no
one knows for sure if a defendant he held would have appeared if
he would have been released. As a result there may be much more
pretrial holding than is necessary.
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What is needed is to make the holding errors and the holding
costs more visible in order to decrease the unnecessary and wrongful
holding. What may also be needed is to decrease the releasing costs
so that judges will be more willing to release defendants. In addition, there is a need for raising and clarifying the probability that
defendants will appear in court since much of the holding may be
based on (1) an unduly low actual or perceived probability of appearing, and also on (2) an unduly vague probability of appearing
plus an implicit strategy saying to hold rather than release when the
situation is unclear. The tendency to hold when in doubt and the
greater sensitivity to releasing errors rather than holding errors run
contrary to the rule of law in pretrial release decisions which says
the benefit of the doubt concerning appearance should go to the
defendant as part of the general presumption of innocence and the
presumption of appearing in court.2" Thus, we are talking about
promoting the rule of law in pretrial release decisions when we talk
about the above-mentioned need for raising and clarifying the probability of appearance, making more visible the type 1 errors and
costs of holding defendants who would appear, and decreasing the
costs of type 2 errors of releasing defendants who fail to appear.
In the top row of the four-cell table in Figure 7, we show that
the expected value of releasing (rather than holding) a defendant
logically equals (1) the benefits of releasing minus (2) the costs of
releasing. The benefits are the positive value to the judge of having
the released defendant appear in court (symbolized +A), and the
costs are the negative value to the judge of having the released
26. The ABA

MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATIVE TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE

provides, at section 1.1, "The law favors the release of defendants pending determination of
guilt or innocence," and at section 5.1 it provides, "It should be presumed that the defendant
is entitled to be released in order to appear on his own recognizance." The Illinois Criminal
Code, 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 110-2 (1963) provides:
When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the accused will
appear as required either before or after conviction, the accused may be released
on his own recognizance . . . . This Section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of relying upon criminal sanctions instead of financial loss to
assure the appearance of the accused. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a) and (b) provide that:
A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to
bail . . . . the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the presence of the defendant, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail, and the
character of the defendant.
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defendant fail to appear in court (symbolized -B). We cannot,
however, merely determine A minus B, because doing so would not
take into consideration that those benefits and costs are contingent
on the probability of the defendant appearing in court. Instead, the
benefits have to be discounted by the probability of their occurring
(that is, the value of A multiplied by P), and the costs have to be
discounted by the probability of their occurring (that is, the value
of B multiplied by 1 minus P).
Likewise, the expected value of holding a defendant in the bottom row of the table equals (1) the discounted benefits of holding
minus (2) the discounted costs of holding. The benefits are the
positive value to the judge of having held the defendant when he
would have failed to appear in court if released (symbolized +B),
and the costs are the negative value to the judge of having held the
defendant when he would have appeared in court if released (symbolized -A). The expected value or discounted net benefits is thus
equal to (-A)(P) + (+B)(1-P). Holding a defendant who would
have appeared in court is a type 1 error (or an alpha error, which
explains the use of the letter A), and releasing a defendant who
would fail to appear is a type 2 error (or beta error, which explains
the use of the letter B). A type 1 error rejects the hypothesis (or
presumption that the defendant will appear) when it is true, and a
type 2 error accepts the hypothesis (that the defendant will appear)
when it is false.
As one can see by some simple algebraic manipulation, the
expected value of releasing varies (1) directly or positively with the
values of P and A, and (2) inversely or negatively with the value of
B. Likewise, the expected value of holding varies (1) inversely with
the values of P and A, and (2) directly with the value of B. Thus, if
we want to increase the expected value of releasing relative to the
expected value of holding, we should logically seek to increase P,
increase A, and decrease B. In other words, we should seek to influence the awareness, perceptions, and facts which relate to (1) the
probability of a defendant appearing in court, (2) the errors and
costs of his being held when he would have appeared, and (3) the
errors and costs of his failing to appear when released. 7
27. An alternative way to categorize what needs to be done to increase the expected value
of releasing relative to the expected value of holding might involve thinking in terms of four
separate cells, rather than two key cells where those two cells determine the values of the
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INCREASING THE PERCENTAGES OF DEFENDANTS RELEASED IN THE PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION
PROBABILITY OF APPEARANCE
Would Fail
to Appear
(1-P)

Would
Appear
(P)

EXPECTED VALUES

Type 2 Error
Release via
ROR or Low Bond

ALTERNATIVE
DECISIONS
AVAILABLE

Hold via
No or High Bond

-- B

EVR-

(-B) (lI-P) + (+A)(P)

EVH.

(+ B)(I-P) + (-A) (P)

There are three general approaches to widening the positive difference between
EV R and EVH :
1.

Raise and clarify the probability of appearance (i.e., Increase P).
1. Raise P through better screening and notification.
2. Clarify P through statistical studies of what percentage of various
types of released defendants appear in court.
3. More vigorously prosecute those who fail to appear.

II.

Make more visible the type 1 errors and costs of holding defendants who
would appear (i.e., Increase A).
1. Publicize for each judge the percent of defendants he holds and the
appearance percent he attains. (Judges vary widely on percent held,
but appearance percentages tend to be about 90 percent.)
2. Make more visible how much it costs to hold defendants in jail.
a. Jail maintenance
d. Families on welfare
b. Lost income
e. Increased conviction probability
c. Bitterness from case disf. Jail riots from overcrowding
missed after lengthy wait

III.

Decrease the costs of type 2 errors of releasing defendants- who fail to
appear (i.e., Decrease B).
1. Make rearrest more easy through pretrial supervision.
2. Decrease the time from arrest to trial.
a. More personnel, more'diversion, and shorter trial stage.
b. Better sequencing of cases.
c. Shorter path from arrest to trial.
3. Decrease pretrial crime committing.
a. Increase probability of being arrested, convicted, and jailed.
b. Decrease benefits of successful crime committing.
c. Increase costs of unsuccessful crime committing.
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2.

RAISE AND CLARIFY THE PROBABILITY OF APPEARANCE

An important way to increase the probability that released defendants will appear is through better screening and notification.
Better screening might involve a combination of the subjective analysis of a defendant's probability of appearing plus a more objective
analysis like that used in the point system of the Vera Institute.
Notifying the defendant by postcard or telephone the day before his
court appearance may often prevent non-appearances especially
by low income defendants who are not accustomed to middle class
procedures for appointment keeping.
To improve the effectiveness of pretrial release screening, more
research is needed to determine what set of variables are the best
predictors and what statistical procedure is the best way to weight
the variables. A study in Rochester interestingly revealed that one
can get better predictability from checking whether or not the defendant was telling the truth with regard to how long he has held
his present job. This yes-no variable predicts better than the variable of whether the defendant has held his present job one month,
six months, a year, or longer."8
These statistical techniques, by aiding in the screening process,
improve the probability that released defendants will appear. They
also clarify that the appearance rate is high for defendants in certain
categories and for defendants in general. That clarification can increase the perceived probability of appearance even if it does not
affect the actual probability of appearance. This is important since
judges are acting on the basis of their perceptions of P although that
indirectly is influenced by what P actually is.
other two cells although they are opposite in sign. More specifically, if releasing is considered
the more desired behavior and holding the less desired behavior, then what needs to be done
is to (1) increase the (perceived) benefits of releasing, (2) decrease the costs of releasing, (3)
decrease the benefits of holding, and (4) increase the costs of holding. Item 2 in this list of
four items corresponds to decreasing B, and item 4 corresponds to increasing A. Item 1 mainly
involves increasing the satisfaction that comes from saving the holding costs, which is the
equivalent of making more visible the value of A. Item 3 mainly involves decreasing the
satisfaction that comes from saving the releasing costs, which is the equivalent of decreasing
the value of B. Thus, with this subject matter, the four-cell approach tends to reduce to two
cells. Either approach to encouraging socially desired behavior could be used where a choice
is present that does not involve a contingent event. In such a situation, one would concentrate
on changing the values of A and B or of a, b, c, and d without one or more P's or probabilities
to be concerned with.
28. This is the Hausman and Thaler study referred to in note 20 supra.
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These statistical techniques can also decrease the gray area as
to who will appear, which can be important in increasing the percentage of defendants released. This is so because many judges may
be well aware that a high percentage of all defendants appear, say
about 90 percent. They may, however, indicate that the problem is
that they do not know in advance which released defendants would
be likely to be in the 90 percent, and which released defendants in
the 10 percent. More specifically, a judge might say he releases
about 70 percent of all defendants because those 70 percent are the
ones he feels are likely to appear. Another 5 percent he feels are very
unlikely to appear. The middle 25 percent he is not sure about either
way, but he tends to hold them rather than risk the embarrassment
of having them not appear. If the size of this gray or unpredicted
25 percent can be reduced, that should mean a substantial increase
in the percentage of defendants released.
The probability of a defendant deliberately choosing not to
appear in court can also be reduced by more vigorously prosecuting
those who fail to appear without an adequate justification. Increasing the probability of such prosecution and the invocation of a substantial penalty raises the expected value of appearing relative to
not appearing for the released defendant, thereby increasing the
likelihood that he will choose to appear. The possibility of forfeiting
one's bond can also encourage appearance for those released on
bond, rather than on their own recognizance. 9
29. The problem of how to increase the probability of a defendant appearing in court
can be thought of as a decision theory problem. The released defendant has basically two
choices, either to appear or not to appear. He will appear if he perceives the expected value
of appearing to be greater than the expected value of not appearing. The expected value of
appearing equals the benefits of appearing (for example, getting one's bond back and avoiding
prosecution) minus the costs of appearing (for example, being subjected to a trial or wasting
time if there is no trial) with those benefits and costs discounted by the probability of their
occurring. The expected value of not appearing equals the benefits of not appearing (for
example, temporarily avoiding either a trial or waiting at the courthouse) minus the costs of
not appearing (for example, losing one's bond and getting prosecuted for bond jumping) with
those benefits and costs discounted by the probability of their occurring. Thus, defendants
are more likely to appear if those perceived benefits and costs can be changed so that the
expected value of appearing will be more often perceived as being the greater value. Notification systems have the effect of reminding defendants of the costs of not appearing and the
benefits of appearing. Screening systems have the effect of finding defendants who are more
likely to perceive the expected value of appearing to be greater than the expected value of
not appearing.
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MAKE MORE VISIBLE THE ERRORS AND COSTS OF HOLDING DEFENDANTS
WHO WOULD APPEAR

The main reason judges are more sensitive to type 2 errors than
type 1 errors is because the error of releasing someone who fails to
appear is presently more visible than the error of holding someone
who would appear. What needs to be done is to increase the visibility of the holding errors. One meaningful way to do that is to show
for each judge serving in the same circuit what percentage of defendants he holds in jail prior to trial, and what percentage of his
released defendants appear for their court dates. We would probably
find a great deal of variation among the judges with regard to the
percentage of defendants they hold. We would probably, however,
not find so much variation among the judges with regard to the
percentage of their released defendants who appear in court.3"
If the judges were arranged on a list from the judge with the
highest holding percentage to the judge with the lowest holding
percentage, we might see that the judge holding the highest percentage of defendants (about 70 percent hold) has an appearance
rate of about 95 percent. The judge holding the fewest defendants
(about 20 percent) might have an appearance rate of about 90 percent. Thus, the highest hold judge could not justify his high holding
rate on the grounds that he is getting a much better appearance rate
than the judges with lower holding percentages. He also would find
it difficult to argue that his sample of defendants is substantially
different than the sample of defendants which his fellow judges have
since there tends to be less shopping in arraignment proceedings
than in trial proceedings. We are thus roughly indicating the number of errors of holding defendants who would appear through the
use of these aggregate statistics, even though it is, impossible to
determine whether such an error has been made in an individual
case where the defendant is held in jail prior to trial.'
30. Variation among the judges in holding rates is partly indicated by substantial varia-

tions in holding rates across cities. See W.

THOMAS,

BAIL

REFORM IN AMERICA

37-64 (1976);

supra note 16. Lower variation among judges on appearance rates and crime-committing rates is partly indicated by the lower variation in those rates across cities. See W.
THOMAS, at 87-109, and NAGEL, supra note 16. The Thomas study showed that when felony
holding rates dropped from 52 percent in 1962 to 33 percent in 1971, and misdemeanor holding
rates dropped from 40 percent in 1962 to 28 percent in 1971, the appearance rates of the
increasingly large number of defendants released only dropped from 94 percent to 91 percent.
31. If contrary to our predictions, we find that the low holding judges on a court have a
substantially worse appearance rate (rather than about the same appearance rate) than the
NAGEL,
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The raw data for calculating hold percentages and appearance
percentages for individual judges can be obtained from the docket
sheets which are public information. Obtaining this data thus requires no special cooperation from the judges the way having them
answer hypothetical sentencing cases would. If these lists were periodically made available, it is likely that judges who are holding a
high percentage of defendants would have a tendency to move
downward. They would be motivated partly because of (1) embarrassment in comparison to their fellow judges, (2) lack of appearance rate justification for their high holding rates, (3) a respect for
the norm of uniformity among judges, and (4) in recognition of the
high holding costs relative to releasing costs, to which we now turn.
In addition to publicizing the errors of holding defendants who
would appear, the costs of such errors can also be publicized. Many
judges may be unaware of how high the holding costs are, and how
many different types of costs are involved. The most obvious is that
of jail maintenance which may be quite substantial when one considers the length of time the average defendant is held, and the fixed
and variable costs needed to provide for him during that time. The
costs also include the lost gross national product which can be attributed to defendants being unable to earn or produce anything
while they are in jail. That cost may also be substantial even if it is
only figured at the minimum wage.
An additional cost that is hard to assess but should still be
analyzed is the bitterness that is generated by being held in jail for
a substantial time awaiting trial, and then having one's case dismissed or acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence of guilt. It might
be interesting to know what percentage of defendants held in jail
prior to trial do have their cases dismissed or acquitted, or receive
sentences shorter than the time they have already served awaiting
trial. Another cost that can be more easily assessed involves deterhigh holding judges, then revealing those differences should have the effect of encouraging
the low holding judges to do more holding. Likewise, if contrary to our predictions, we find
the judges have about the same holding rates (rather than substantial variation in their
holding rates) and different appearance rates, then revealing those differences should stimulate the judges with lower appearance rates to be more selective in whom they release and
possibly to raise their holding rates. If the judges have about the same holding rates and about
the same appearance rates, that revelation is not likely to change any behavior, even though
lowering their holding rates might save holding costs without a commensurate increase in

releasing costs, and even though raising their holding rates might save releasing costs without
a commensurate increase in holding costs.
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mining the number of families who are on welfare as the result of a
breadwinner being held in jail prior to trial. Another cost from unnecessarily holding the defendants prior to trial is the cost of jail
riots due to overcrowding. In recent years in New York, Washington,
D.C., and elsewhere, some jail riots have been substantially attributed to the overcrowding from pretrial detention.
Still another important holding cost is the cost to due process
which stems from the increased probability of an innocent defendant being convicted because he was unable to adequately prepare
his case while being held in jail, and because he made a substantially poorer impression on the judge or jury by being a pre-trial
detainee. Research by the Vera Institute does show that pre-trial
detention increases the probability of conviction even when all other
relevant variables are held constant. Pre-trial detainees who may be
innocent or whose guilt may be quite difficult to prove are also quite
vulnerable to prosecution offers to reduce the recommended sentence to the time served awaiting trial if the defendant will plead
guilty. Released defendants are not vulnerable to that particular
kind of pressure. Pretrial detainees may also be more likely to be
convicted regardless of their guilt because they get faster trials while
the prosecution witnesses are still fresh. Some prosecutors may concentrate on prosecuting pretrial detainees to the neglect of released
defendants out of a feeling that detainees should receive a priority
or because speedy trial laws emphasize fast trials for detainees.
By publicizing for each judge the percent of defendants he holds
and the appearance percent he attains, and by making more visible
how much it costs to hold defendants in jail, we are in effect trying
to make the ratio between each judge's individual holding costs and
individual releasing costs approach the ratio between society's holding costs and society's releasing costs. As of now, the judge's individual costs seem to produce a much lower ratio than the social costs.
In other words, as an individual, a judge stands to lose more by
making a mistake by releasing a no show than by making a mistake
of holding a defendant who would show, but society generally stands
to lose more by a holding mistake than by a releasing mistake, given
the relative social costs involved and the probabilities of their occurring. 2
32. Some judges or legislators may have a more narrow or different concept of social costs
than others have. For example, making more visible the holding cost of lost gross national

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

4.

[Vol. 31:1433

DECREASE THE COSTS OF RELEASING DEFENDANTS WHO FAIL TO APPEAR

There are two main costs involved in releasing a defendant who
fails to appear. One is the cost of having to rearrest him. The other
is the cost of any crime he might commit while released. That crime
cost theoretically, however, is not supposed to be a major criterion
in determining whether a defendant should be released, since regularly including it would amount to a constitutionally questionable
system of preventive detention, as contrasted to including it in exceptional cases like those involving obviously dangerous defendants.
The rearresting cost (and incidentally the crime-committing cost)
can be reduced by having a better knowledge of where the defendant
is through a system of pretrial parole. Such a system would involve
releasing the defendant on the condition that he at least periodically
report his whereabouts, or be subject to rearrest for failure to do so.
Heavy supervision in all cases, however, might be more costly than
the incremental rearresting and crime-committing savings over an
unsupervised system.
A way to substantially reduce both the non-appearance and
crime-committing costs would be to reduce the time from arrest to
trial. The longer the defendant is out, the more the probability
increases that he will negligently or deliberately fail to appear, and
the more time he has to become involved in a new criminal act. The
defendant's ultimate non-appearance is especially increased if during that intervening period he is repeatedly told to come to court
which he does, and due to congestion and delay the court is unready
to hear his case. Thus, the pretrial release problem is closely associated with the problem of reducing delay in the criminal justice
system ."
product may be less impressive to some judges than other judges as compared to the extra
jail maintenance costs even if both dollar amounts are equal. Likewise, some judges may be
relatively unconcerned with jail maintenance costs if they are borne by the state government
rather than by their own local government. This further illustrates the value of working with
non-monetary measures which tend to express the relative perceived utility of alternative
possibilities to the decision-makers rather than the more superficial, but often more measurable, monetary measures.
33. One possible benefit from delaying the trial of released defendants is that while on
bond, they may feel constrained to be more law abiding in order to avoid having their bond
and release revoked, and especially to avoid more severe treatment from the prosecutor and
the court when the case eventually does come up. Release on bond in some cases, however,
may encourage crimes that would not otherwise have occurred if the defendant engages in
illegal behavior in order to pay a bondsman.
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Delay can be reduced by having more judicial personnel, diverting more cases away from the criminal justice system or at least
away from trial, and attempting to shorten the trial stage through
pretrial discovery and random jury selection. Delay can also be
reduced by better sequencing and scheduling of cases. For example,
if all the short cases were given a priority, the average waiting time
would be reduced, although a maximum time constraint should be
placed on all cases. Theoretically by shortening the path from arrest
to trial through the elimination of certain stages, delay could be
substantially reduced, but doing so might violate federal or state
constitutional constraints.
Releasing costs that relate to crimes committed by released
defendants can be reduced by the same methods which can be suggested for crime reduction in general. They basically involve applying a model like that shown in Figure 6 to reduce the expected value
of crime committing and increase the expected value of engaging in
legitimate alternate activities. By analogy to Figure 6, these methods logically include increasing the probability of being arrested,
convicted, and jailed which can come about through such means as
a more efficient criminal justice system or through less due process.
The expected value of crime committing is also reduced by decreasing the benefits of successful crime committing through such means
as reducing the vulnerability of potential crime targets, and reducing the peer group recognition that criminals often receive by trying
to redirect gang orientations. The expected value of crime is further
reduced by increasing the costs of unsuccessful crime committing
possibly through more severe punishments, or by having criminals
suffer the opportunity costs of missed occupational opportunities by
first providing them with some meaningful opportunities to miss.
One method that would increase the probability of appearance
and also decrease the cost of rearresting defendants who fail to
appear is the method of high bond setting. If the bond is high and
sure to be forfeited for non-appearance, the defendant is more likely
to appear. Likewise, if the bond is high, or at least high enough to
cover the rearrest costs, then if the defendant fails to appear, his
bond forfeiture can be used to reduce those rearrest costs to zero in
the average case. This makes bond setting like a pollution tax which
has often been proposed in environmental law (the tax on a given
firm is to the total dollars desired to clean up the area as the firm's
pollution is to the total pollution in the area). That kind of proportionate tax is designed to deter pollution, analogous to deterring
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non-appearance. If, however, a business firm cannot economically
eliminate its pollution, then the tax it pays is used to clean up or
reduce the damage its pollution has caused, analogous to paying the
rearrest costs. This high bond approach has the undesirable effect
of increasing the likelihood of holding defendants, unlike the other
approaches which do not produce conflicting effects. This approach
logically raises the question of how high the bond should be in order
to increase the probability of appearance and decrease the releasing
costs, without counter-productively increasing the occurrence of
holding. That is the issue of devising optimum bond schedules to
which we now turn.
III.

THE BOND-SETTING DECISION ACROSS CASES

A.

Non-DiscretionaryBond Schedules
1.

THE PROBLEM

Thus far, we have been discussing the releasing and bondsetting decision on an individual case-by-case basis although we
used illustrative data representing an average defendant rather than
a specific defendant. Now, however, we would like to discuss the
problem of developing rules designed to cut across cases of a given
type as is done in non-discretionary bond schedules which specify,
for example, that bond for non-aggravated battery shall be $1,000.11
Bond schedules like that are increasingly being used to set bond by
the police when judges are not available at night or on weekends in
misdemeanor cases. Bond that is determined by such a schedule can
be subsequently lowered or raised in a judicial proceeding initiated
by the defendant or the prosecutor. There may also be an increase
in the use of such schedules by arraignment judges in view of their
advocacy by various legal scholars. 5 At the turn of the century,
judicial reformers advocated indeterminate sentences in hopes of
obtaining enlightened individualized discretion in criminal cases.
34. E.g., 110A ILL. REV. STAT. § 528c (1969) states: "Bail for misdemeanors (other than
traffic or conservation offenses) punishable by fine or imprisonment in a penal institution
other than a penitentiary, shall be $1,000."
35. M. Kelly, Social Science Evaluationand Criminal Justice Policy-Making: The Case
of Pre-Trial Release, in PUBLIC POLICY EVALUATION (Dolbeare ed. 1975); Wisotsky, Use of a
Master Bond Schedule: Equal Justice Under Law?, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 808 (1970); W.
THOMAS, supra note 4 at 211-13 and 258-59; R. HAND & R. SINGER, SENTENCING COMPUTATIONS
LAWS AND PRACTICE 2-39 (1974).
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By mid-century, judicial reformers had become somewhat disillusioned with the feasibility of obtaining such enlightened discretion,
especially in view of various studies which show how arbitrary sentencing and other forms of judicial discretion have become." As a
result, there is an increasing tendency to return to more objective
although automatic standards as being preferable to arbitrary discretion and as being much more feasible than enlightened discretion."'
The problem here is one of scientifically determining what bond
should be set for each crime and for different types of defendants
where the characteristics of the defendant can be legally considered.
It would be unconstitutional to have one bond schedule for blacks
and one for whites, regardless of what might be shown scientifically
about the relation between race and appearance rates. So long as
the correlation is substantially short of a perfect correlation (for
example, where no blacks appear and all whites do), we do not want
to use such a correlation because it would result in too many type 2
errors of releasing white persons who should be held, and would
especially result in too many type 1 errors of holding black persons
who should be released. It would not, however, be unconstitutional
to provide lower bonds for teenagers than for adults so as to facilitate the release of teenagers for whom the holding costs to society
may be greater in terms of creating increased criminal behavior. A
bond schedule that takes ability to pay into consideration would
also probably be constitutional although it might be easier to administer such a schedule if ability to pay were dichotomized into
indigent and non-indigent with indigency determined as part of the
proceeding associated with appointing the public defender or assigned counsel. Just as bond schedules can vary from state to state,
36. M.

FRANKEL,

supra note 1; R.

DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,

(1969); A. TREEACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE: CONSTIPROCESS (1964); Nagel, Disparitiesin Criminal Procedure,

LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE
TUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE CRIMINAL

14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1272 (1967); D. FOGEL,"..
MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975).

WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF.

THE JUSTICE

37. The Illinois legislature is currently considering the adoption of a sentencing system
in which all sentences are fixed rather than indeterminate. The fixed terms are specified for
certain types of crimes and defendants by statute with no judicial or parole board discretion,
although discretion in the charging process is still available to the prosecutor. The fixed term
can be reduced one day for each day of good time in prison, but the good time cannot be
retroactively taken away if the defendant subsequently misbehaves. See J. FOSTER, DEFINITE
SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES (1976).
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they can also probably vary by size of city within a state in view of
the different relation between bond and the probability of appearing
in rural, urban, and metropolitan areas.
2.

THE GOAL AND A SOLUTION

The ideal or optimum bond for a given crime and type of defendant would be the bond that maximizes the probability of the
defendant appearing in court (PA) while minimizing the probability
of his being held in jail (PH). A major defect in this statement of
the optimum is that it fails to consider that as the bond goes up,
the probability of appearing goes up which is desirable, but the
probability of being held in jail also goes up which is undesirable.
Thus, we cannot simultaneously maximize PA while minimizing
PH.
A better statement of the optimum bond for a given crime
would thus be that the optimum non-discretionary bond is the bond
that maximizes the difference between the probability of appearing
and the probability of being held, or that maximizes PA - PH. For
the average defendant in the data on which Figure 3 is based, the
probability of appearance is .92, and the probability of being held
in jail is .27. Thus, in the average case, the bond is being set at such
a level that PA - PH equals .65. Perhaps through a scientifically
determined bond schedule, that difference could be made even
greater partly by raising PA, but mainly by lowering PH. Even if
the bond schedule did not increase the .65 difference, it might still
be an improvement over the prevailing system if it substantially
decreases arbitrary and discriminatory bond-setting, particularly if
there is a system for adjudicating cases where the defendant can
show that the automatic bond is especially unreasonable in his specific case. Too easy a system for adjudicating the automatic bond,
however, would lead to disparities that favor those who have access
to expensive lawyers who could obtain a lower bond and disfavor
those who do not. 8
38. Usually if a defendant can afford an expensive lawyer, he can also afford a high bond.
Thus, easy adjudication of the automatic bond would probably not favor the rich, but rather
favor middle income defendants who are not rich enough to meet the high bond, but not poor
enough to have to rely on the public defender. In other words, the rich defendant does not
need an easy system for arguing that the automatic bond is unreasonable, and the poor
defendant may have a lawyer who lacks the time and assistance to be able to effectively argue
for a bond reduction. This kind of discriminatory pattern against the poor may, however, not
be as great under automatic bond schedules as under traditional bond setting systems if the
bond schedules tend to involve lower bonds in recognition of the fact that those bonds produce
the best PA - PH values.
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To set a bond figure that maximizes PA - PH, one could
simply determine for a large set of past cases what was the average
bond set for the disorderly conduct cases, the shoplifting cases, and
so on. The past average would thus become the future automatic
bond. This may be the way some bond schedules are established.
That would be more scientific (that is, more based on empirical
data) and possibly more rational (that is, more likely to maximize
PA - PH) than a kind of gut reaction attempt to create a bond
schedule. That average-bond method, however, presumes that past
practice has been as rational as one can get. Such a presumption
may be quite faulty.
A possibly more goal-effective alternative would be to take that
large set of past disorderly conduct cases, shoplifting cases, and so
on, and then group the cases for a given crime into various bond
categories somewhat like those used in the questionnaire in Figure
6. The set of approximately ten categories used should vary with the
crime, and they should be set up in such a way that each category
has approximately the same number of cases.3" For each bond category in the disorderly conduct cases, we would then determine what
percentage of the defendants appeared in court (that is, PA for that
category on that crime), and we would determine what percent of
the defendants were held in jail (that is, PH for that category on
that crime).
That information could easily be plotted on a figure like Figure
8. For each bond category, there is a dot corresponding to the percent of appearance for that category (PA), and an X corresponding
to the percent of being held for that category (PH).10 There are thus
39. Although somewhat more difficult to handle, the subsequent interpolation and
curve-fitting would be more meaningful if each bond category involved an equal interval in
the sense of covering an equal number of dollars rather than covering an equal number of
cases. Equal-distance intervals (that is, equal dollars) are more difficult to work with than
equal-frequency intervals (that is, equal cases) in the analysis which follows because the base
of the percentages (that is, the number of cases) for each equal-distance interval may sometimes be too small to produce reliable percentages. A good compromise in the bond-setting
context might involve seven or so equal-distance intervals or categories, with a zero category
added saying "less than $1," and a last category added saying "more than D dollars." The
"less than $1" category refers to release on recognizance, someone else's assurance of appearance, a specified cash bond which is not collected but which would be collected and forfeited
if non-appearance occurs, or other release not involving a cash or property deposit. "D dollars" is the highest figure one can have and still have seven equal distance intervals between
category zero and the last category, given the nature of the crime and the bond-setting data
that relates to it.
40. Figure 8 is drawn rather roughly to illustrate the hypothesized general relations
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ten pairs of dots and X's. To find the pair where PA - PH is
greatest, all we have to do is just subtract each PH from its corresponding PA. Doing so will possibly tell us with this hypothetical
data that bond category 4 involves the biggest difference between
PA and PH. Therefore, we could specify that the midpoint of the
interval for category 4 or the range for category 4 shall be the fixed
bond for disorderly conduct in medium-size cities in the state of
Illinois (that is, in cities between 100,000 and 1,000,000 population)." In other words, what we have done is in effect to treat the
probability of appearing as being like income, and the probability
of being held as being like expenses, and we are trying to find the
optimum price or quantity to produce that will maximize income
minus expenses.42
between PA and the bond level categories, and between PH and the bond level categories. A
more exactly drawn PH curve would end at the zero point in the lower left hand corner of
the graph if the zero level category meant release on one's own recognizance since there would
then be zero probability of being held. Likewise, a more exactly drawn PA curve would curve
upward at the zero bond level category because those who are released on their own recognizance usually have a high probability of appearing by virtue of their background characteristics, not because of the incentive to retrieve their bond. Thus, to make Figure 8 more meaningful for bond-setting purposes, the zero level or ROR category should probably not be
included in the analysis.
41. This approach of trying to find a bond level for each crime that maximizes the
probability of appearing minus the probability of being held can be contrasted with both the
prevailing highly discretionary bond-setting and with non-discretionary schedules that
merely codify previous average bond levels for given crimes or that use arbitrary bond levels
to achieve objectivity but fail to adequately achieve pretrial release goals. By seeking bond
levels that maximize PA minus PH, objectivity is likely to be increased. There is also likely
to be a small increase or no change in appearance rates, and a substantial decrease in holding
rates, since optimum bond levels in light of that PA - PH criteria are likely to be quite low,
but without lowering the probability of appearing. A pretrial release system in which there
are no money bonds at all might at first glance seem fairer in not discriminating against the
poor. If, however, such a system allows considerable judicial discretion as to who will be held
rather than released on one's own recognizance, then stereotypes and prejudices may result
in more, not less, discrimination and more ineffectiveness in achieving the goal of maximizing
appearance rates minus holding rates. A pretrial release system that completely abolishes
money bonds is also not likely to be adopted.
42. As an alternative to Figure 8 where we plot PA and PH separately, we could plot
one curve showing PA minus PH at each bond level category. Such a curve would tend to be
relatively low at both the lowest and the highest bond level categories. It would be relatively
high at a low to middling bond level category where in Figure 8 the gap between PA - PH is
greatest. Such a hill-shaped curve could be adequately expressed by the equation PA - PH =
a + bC + bC where C represents the bond level category for say ten categories, and where
the values of b, and b, are determined by a computerized regression analysis which involves
providing the computer with ten sets of values for C (from 1 to 10), C squared (from 1 to 100),
and the corresponding PA - PH from the data gathered. The optimum C (or C corresponding
to the maximum PA - PH) is equal to -b,/2b, by virtue of the algebra rules for finding the
value of X where Y is a maximum, and Y has a quadratic relation with X.
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FIGURE 8.

THE RELATION BETWEEN LEVEL OF BOND AND BOTH
THE PROBABILITY OF APPEARING IN COURT AND THE
PROBABILITY OF BEING HELD IN JAIL
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BOND LEVEL CATEGORY
(Hypothetical data for the crime of disorderly conduct in medium sized cities in
the state of Illinois)

3.

VARIATIONS ON THE SOLUTION

With this data, however, we could try to fit a smooth curve to
the PA dots and another smooth curve to the PH X's. We could then
geometrically or algebraically determine where the greatest separation exists between those two curves. Doing so might reveal that the
optimum bond category is 4.6, and by simple interpolation we could
translate that into a dollar figure. The type of smooth curve that is
likely to nicely fit our dots and X's is a third-degree polynomial or
cube law or S-shaped curve of the form PA or PH = a + b,C + b2 C1
+ bC 3 where C stands for category number. The a, b,, b2, and b,
are coefficients whose value can easily be determined by feeding
into a computer the ten PA's, the ten C numbers from 1 to 10, their
squares, and their cubes, along with a linear regression program,
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and then doing the same thing for the ten PH's.43 Once we have
those numerical coefficients, then we want to find the slope of PA
- PH relative to C. After we find that slope through the elementary
rules for finding slopes, we want to set that slope equal to 0, and
then solve for C in terms of the numerical coefficients. Where the
slope of PA - PH relative to C becomes zero after rising up and
before starting down is where PA - PH is at a maximum. Solving
for C at that point involves solving a quadratic equation. Doing so
and then interpolating will give us a more precise bond figure than
merely finding the percent of appearance and corresponding percent
of being held that have the biggest difference." Finding a precise
point within a bond category or interval (rather than simply using
the range of the category or a range around the precise point) might,
however, not be desirable because an optimum bond schedule
should probably provide ranges for each crime which allow some
discretion rather than a precise point or dollar figure which allows
no discretion. 5
.If a legislature considers promoting appearance to be twice as
important as promoting release, then the goal to maximize might
be expressed as 2(PA) minus PH and the optimum bond interval
43. On fitting curves like third-degree polynomials to data like that shown in Figure 7,

see H.

BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS
AND POLICY 108-34 (1974).

459-62 (1972); E. Tur,

DATA ANALYSIS FOR POLITICS

44. On finding the slope of a difference between two polynomials, setting the slope to
zero, and then solving for the independent variable, see S. RICHMOND supra note 3, at 40-86;
BRENNAN, PREFACE TO ECONOMETRICS 111-79 (1973). If the equation for the PA curve is PA
2
3
= a + bC + bC + bC , and the equation for the PH curve is PH = a' + bC + b'Cl + b,'C',

M.

then PA-PH = (a-a') + (b,-b,')C + (b-b')CI + (brb,)C1. That equation simplifies to
2
PA-PH = A + B,C + BC + BC1, where A = a-a', B, = b,-b,', B, = b:-b,', and B, = b,-b,'.
Given that equation, the slope of PA-PH relative to C is B. + 2BXC + 3Bc. Setting that
slope equal to 0 and solving for the value of C involves solving the quadratic equation formula
C* 2= (-2B: ±--2Bzl - 12BIB,) / 6B,), since if c + bX + aX1 = 0, then X = (-b - / b--4ac) / 2a.
45. The most meaningful way to relate bond level to either the probability of appearing
or the probability of being held might be to plot each case individually rather than by groups,
categories, or intervals which are subjectively arrived at. If each case is plotted individually,
the dot plotted for PA would either be at 1.00 or at zero since the defendant would have either
appeared or not appeared. With that set of data for a large number of cases, one can fit an
S-shaped curve to the PA data by using the method described in note 44 supra and the
accompanying text, except that each C would correspond not to a bond category number, but

rather to the exact amount of

the bond for each case. One can do likewise with the PH data.

One can then find the exact bond level where PA - PH is at a maximum by using the method
described in note 44 or 42 supra and the accompanying text. This more exact approach,
however, may not be as simple to work with as the approach that involves grouped data, as
described in note 39 supra and the accompanying text.
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would be the one that is highest on that goal. In more general terms,
one could say the goal to be maximized is W(PA) minus PH, where
W is the desirability weight of PA relative to PH. The value of W
could be less than, one if PH is valued more highly than PA. For
example, the value of W could be .5 if PH is considered twice as
important as PA.
For a still more realistic way to expresg the goal for determining
an optimum bond interval, one might use the expression (PA) w
divided by PH. Doing so takes into consideration that as the probability of appearing increases, community satisfaction increases, but
not at a constant rate in view of the fact that the first unit of a good
thing normally produces more incremental satisfaction than the
second unit. Likewise, the dividing takes into consideration that as
the probability of holding increases, community satisfaction decreases, but not at a constant rate in view of the fact that the first
unit of a bad thing normally produces more incremental dissatisfaction than the second unit. The W still represents the desirability
weight of PA relative to PH, but it is now an exponent of PA rather
than a multiplier. This goal is in effect like a weighted benefit-cost
ratio to be maximized by finding the optimum or highest-scoring
bond interval for each type of crime in each geographical area.
In addition to being useful for determining an optimum bond
level for each type of crime, the kind of data shown in Figure 8 can
also be helpful for obtaining a better understanding of the relation
between bond setting and other variables. If the hypothetical data
shown in Figure 8 is reasonably accurate, that means at the lower
bond levels, the probability of being held is continuously quite low;
and at the higher bond levels, the probability of being held is continuously quite high. Only in the middle levels is there a substantial
variation between bond level and the probability of being held, or
for that matter the probability of appearing in court. In other words,
the average individual can equally meet a bond of $10, $20, $30, and
so on at the low levels; and will equally fail to meet a bond of
$100,000, $200,000, $300,000 and so on at the high levels. The probability of appearing may drop and stay especially low when the bond
is low and a bond forfeiture is treated as a fine with little or no
likelihood of prosecution for bond jumping. If our data is reasonably
accurate, we can predict what PA and PH will be at various bond
categories for the average disorderly conduct case in medium-size
Illinois cities or whatever our data base is. That kind of predictive
power could be helpful to judges in discretionary bond-setting cases
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either done geometrically with figures like Figure 8 or done algebraically with a third-degree polynomial equation. Thus, the kind of
analysis represented by Figure 7 can be helpful in both the making
of bond-setting statutes and in the resolving of specific bond-setting
4
cases.
B.

The Optimum Percentageto Release

Another pre-trial release problem that cuts across cases is the
problem of trying to decide approximately what should be the opti-

mum percentage of defendants to release prior to trial. If too few are
46. S. A. Schaffer, Bail and Parole Jumping in Manhattan in 1967 (an unpublished
paper of the New York Vera Institute of Justice) provides some empirical data on the relation
between bond levels and both the probability of appearance and the probability of being held
which reinforce the general nature of the hypothetical curves shown in Figure 8. With regard
to PA, his data shows at page 29:
Bond Level

Prob. of
Appearance

$ 1-$ 25
$ 26-$ 50
$ 51 - $100
$101 -$250

.76
.82
.81
.84

Bond Level
$ 251-$ 500
$ 501-$1000
$1001 - $2500
Over $2500

Prob. of
Appearance
.95
.93
.89
(1.00)

Probabilities in parentheses indicate that the number of cases was between 11 and 50,
whereas probabilities not in parentheses indicate the number of cases was over 50. The
general pattern shown here is that the probability of appearance does generally increase as
the bond level increases although that pattern may have been clearer if separate charts were
shown for each crime rather than combining all cases together. One would expect higher
bonds for more severe crimes and generally a lower probability of appearance for more severe
crimes, which means crime severity should be held constant in order to determine the relation
between the bond level and probability of appearance.
With regard to PH, Schaffer's data shows at page 23:
Bond Level

Prob. of
Being Held

Under $100
$101 - $500
$501 - $1000

.03
.57
.65

Bond Level
$1001 - $2500
Over $2500

Prob. of
Being Held
.80
.96

The general pattern shown here is that the probability of being held does clearly increase as
the bond level increases. That is probably true regardless of the crime although some crimes
are disproportionately committed by poorer people who are less able to meet a given bond
level. Note that (as in Figure 8) PA tends to be above PH for a given bond level. They come
close together at very high bond levels, and seem to be farthest apart in the second category
of $26 to $50. The fact that Schaffer uses different bond level categories for the two sets of
relations complicates the analysis and illustrates the subjectivity of arriving at appropriate
bond level categories as mentioned in notes 45 and 39 supra.
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released, there will be excessive holding costs although releasing
costs will be down. If too many defendants are released, there will
be excessive releasing costs although holding costs will be down. An
optimum percentage to release can be found in a manner similar to
the Figure 7 approach to finding an optimum bond level. We can
in effect plot total holding costs and total releasing costs for different releasing percentages in the same city at different points in
time, in different cities at the same point in time, or a combination
of both. The optimum percentage is the percentage where the sum
of the holding costs plus the releasing costs is at a minimum, or
where the sum of the holding benefits plus the releasing benefits is
at a maximum.
That kind of analysis is the subject of a separate paper. 7 What
we briefly want to discuss here is how that kind of analysis relates
back to pretrial release decisions in individual cases and in nondiscretionary bond schedules. All three kinds of analysis will be
reconcilable if they all consider the same values in the same cases.
Thus, when that occurs, if the optimum percentage analysis indicates that total costs are minimized when 96 percent of the defendants are released, then the bond schedule approach will also result
in releasing 96 percent of the defendants as will the individual case
approach. We cannot, however, be sure that the judges in the nonmonetary individual case analysis are operating under the same
values as we included in the monetary case analysis. We know that
in our bond schedule analysis, we did not use the same values as
we used in the monetary individual case analysis because of the
need to simplify when one is working across cases rather than in an
individual case. We further know that the optimum percentage to
hold is not the same as the actual percentage held.4
These variations inform us that our models are not completely
capturing empirical reality with regard to what goes on in pretrial
47. S. NAGEL, supra note 16.
48. The 96 percent optimum release level arrived at in S. NAGEL, supra note 16 and the
optimum bond amount of $26 to $50 arrived at in note 46 supra would be equal to each other
in their results if they were based on the same empirical data and the same normative values.
The 96 percent optimum release figure, however, is based on data from a sample of 23 cities,
whereas the $26 to $50 optimum bond figure is based on data from New York City, although
both figures are for approximately the year 1969. Likewise, the 96 percent optimum release
figure is based on more considerations than just maximizing PA - PH. Those additional
considerations include minimizing pretrial crime-committing and having monetary weights
associated with PA and PH.
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release. Those discrepancies could possibly be remedied by gathering more questionnaire and other data in order to make our models
fit reality better. Those discrepancies could also possibly be remedied by trying to get judges and legislators to move closer to the
models if the models have some aspects that are more rational and
objective than may be present in the prevailing decision-making.
Perhaps what is needed is more realistic social science and more
rationalistic governmental decision-making, both at the same time.
IV.

SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

In addition to the above general statement on the need for
realism and rationalism, it seems appropriate to also conclude by
stating what specific hypotheses our deductive analysis has implicitly generated that might now be explicitly tested with additional
data. One set of hypotheses are largely methodological in nature and
relate to the measuring tools which have been presented. We in
effect hypothesized that the questionnaire approach included in
Figure 2 would be a meaningful way to determine the satisfaction
and dissatisfaction received by an arraignment judge from releasing
a defendant who would or would not appear or from holding a defendant who would or would not appear. The same kind of measuring instrument involving rank ordering, anchoring, and then relative numerical measures could also be applied to other decision
makers in the criminal justice process. The second measuring tool
presented involved multiple sets of hypothetical situations like the
set included in Figure 6. We implicitly hypothesized that such an
approach would be a meaningful way of determining the relative
importance of various criteria in bond-setting and other decisions
more so than an approach directly asking decision makers what
criteria they use. Likewise, the decision theory questionnaire of
Figure 2 seems to be a more meaningful way of determining threshold probabilities for releasing defendants than directly asking a
judge what his threshold probability is.
'In addition to the measuring instruments, our analysis has implicitly stated a number of substantive hypotheses that might merit
further testing. They include such'statements as: (1) some arraignment judges are mainly oriented toward avoiding the release of badrisk defendants and a probably smaller group of other judges are
mainly oriented toward avoiding the holding of good-risk defendants; (2) there are substantial relationships between the back-
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ground and attitudinal characteristics of arraignment judges and
their orientations toward avoiding type 1 and type 2 errors; (3) there
are substantial relationships between the characteristics of the defendants and their crimes and the threshold probabilities indicated
by the responding judges to the decision theory situations; (4) there
are substantial relationships between the characteristics of the
cities, particularly regarding holding and releasing costs, and the
threshold probabilities indicated by the responding judges; (5)
judges who tend to perceive the probability of appearing as being
low are judges who demand a high probability of appearing before
they will release; (6) in the five above hypotheses, one could substitute probability of not committing a crime for the probability of
appearing in order to test the role of both probabilities in pretrial
release decisions; (7) arraignment judges tend to set bond in terms
of past average bonds for certain crimes rather than in terms of an
analysis of the defendant's probability of appearing in court at various bond levels; and (8) the probability of appearing and the probability of being held in jailbear a positively-sloped S-shaped relationship with bond levels like that shown in Figure 7.
In addition to the above substantive hypotheses which emphasize understanding why variations occur in pretrial release, the
analysis also generates hypotheses concerning how to improve the
pretrial release system in light of given goals. For example: (1) if
judges are informed how their threshold probabilities, holding percentages, and appearance percentages compare to their fellow
judges, then those judges who are relatively more different will tend
to change their attitudes and behavior more toward the average; (2)
if data is obtained on holding costs and releasing costs from various
cities, one will find that the expected value or cost of releasing is
substantially less than the expected value or cost of holding for the
average defendant, thus supporting the rationality of releasing the
average defendant although the costs may exceed the benefits for
certain types of defendants; (3) if arraignment judges want to maximize the benefits minus the costs in a bond setting decision, they
should decide in terms of an analysis of the defendant's probability

of appearing in court at various bond levels; (4) if legislators, state
supreme courts, or other bond-schedule makers want to maximize
the probability of appearing minus the probability of being held,
they should adopt the bond level for each crime where (in the past)
the separation between those two probabilities or percentages has
been greatest; (5) if arraignment judges want to minimize the sum
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of the holding costs and releasing costs, they should hold only about
five percent of all defendants; and (6) to more accurately determine
the probability of a defendant appearing in court, an arraignment
judge should make some use of the multiple-variable prediction
schemes developed by such socio-legal programs as the Vera Institute.
In light of the above implications raised by the analysis, one
can possibly reach the overall conclusion that decision theory is a
useful' approach for generating some insights, hypotheses, and explanations with regard to pretrial release decisions. One might also
be able to see how decision theory can be a similarly useful approach
with regard to other decisions in the criminal justice process that
relate to contingent events, such as the decision by a police officer
to arrest rather than issue a summons, a prosecutor or defense counsel to go to trial rather than accept an out-of-court settlement, a
sentencing judge or parole board to incarcerate or continue incarceration, a jury to find liability or convict, and a lawyer to appeal.
Decision theory is a provocative way to conceptualize what is and
what ought to be involved in decision-making. The approach in
itself does not provide hard data answers, but it may serve a useful
function by providing many questions and also by providing a
means for integrating the answers being developed.49
49. The measuring instruments, the substantive or causal hypotheses, and the meansends or prescriptive hypotheses mentioned above are the subject of an empirical research
design proposal which has been submitted by Nagel and Neef to the National Science Foundation and other funding agencies under the title "Decision Theory and the Criminal Justice
System." The research design basically involves working with 20 federal and state court
systems to (1) increase the sensitivity of criminal justice decision-makers to avoiding type 1
errors, (2) develop more objective and effective decision-making guidelines for criminal justice decision-makers, and (3) to better understand the threshold probabilities of criminal
justice decision-makers. A copy of the proposal is available from the authors on request.
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A.

APPENDICES

Glossary of Symbols

REPRESENTS

SYMBOL

FIRST
APPEARING

ERRORS, TYPE OF:
Type 1 error An error of holding a defendant who

would appear or who should be released (rejecting a true hypothesis
or presumption)

I-Al

Type 2 error An error of releasing a defendant

who would fail to appear or who
should be held (accepting a false hypothesis or presumption)

I-Al

EXPECTED VALUES:

EV H
EVR

Expected value of holding a defendant

II-B

Expected value of releasing a defendant

1I-B

HOLDING COSTS AND BENEFITS:
HC
HB

Holding costs in keeping a defendant
1

HB 2

in jail pending trial

I-A3

Holding benefits which result from
rearresting releasing costs being
saved when defendant is held

I-A3

Holding benefits which result from
crime-committing releasing costs being saved when defendant is held

I-A3

JUDGES, TYPE OF:
Judge 1A

Judge 1B

Judge who is more worried about
holding a good-risk defendant than
releasing a bad-risk defendant

I-Al

Judge who is more worried about Ireleasing a bad-risk defendant than
holding a good-risk defendant

I-Al
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PROBABILITIES, SEPARATE:
PA, or just P Probability that defendant will appear or percent of defendants who
have appeared for a given bond-setting category
PA*, or P*

PC

PF, or 1-P
PH

PN
PN*

I-Al

Threshold probability of appearance

that has to be met before judge will
release a defendant in a given situation

I-Al

Probability or percent of defendants
committing a serious crime while
released

I-A3

Probability or percent of defendants
failing to appear in court

I-A3

Probability of defendant being held
in jail or percent of defendants that
are held for a given bond setting category
Probability of defendant not committing a serious crime if released

II-B
I-A2

Threshold probability of defendant
not committing a crime that has to
be met before judge will release a
defendant in a given situation

PROBALITIES, COMBINATION:
A

B

C

D

Probability of appearing in court
and not committing a crime while
released

I-A3

Probability of failing to appear in
court and not committing a crime
while released

I-A3

Probability of appearing in court
and committing a crime when released
Probability of failing to appear in
court and committing a crime while
released

I-A3

I-A3
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RELATING PA AND PH TO BOND LEVEL:
Value of PA or PH when bond-setting category C or level equals zero

a
b 1' b 2' b3

Ratio between a change in PA or PH
3
and a change in C, C 2, or C

C

II-B

Bond-setting category number from
1 to 10 that was used in specific
cases to be fed into a computerized
regression analysis to obtain values
fora, b 1 , b 2 and b 3

I-B

I-B

RELEASING COSTS AND BENEFITS:

RB
RC 1

RC 2

Releasing benefits, or the holding
costs saved by releasing a defendant

I-A3

Releasing cost of rearresting an average defendant, estimated at $200
each

I-A3

Releasing cost of a crime committed
by an average defendant while released, estimated at $1,000 each

I-A3

SATISFACTION ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT
OCCURRENCES:
Cell a, or -B

Cell b, or +B

Cell c, or -A

Cell d, or +A

Relative dissatisfaction received by a
judge if defendant fails to appear
after being released

I-Al

Relative satisfaction received by a
judge if defendant appears after being released

I-Al

Relative satisfaction received by a
judge if he holds a defendant when
he would have failed to appear if released

I-Al

Relative dissatisfaction received by
a judge if he holds a defendant when
he would have appeared if released

I-Al

MISCELLANEOUS SYMBOLS:
ROR

Release of the defendant on his own
recognizance without any bond

I-Al
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Basic Formulas Used

Note: See the glossary for the definition of the symbols in the
context of the formula presented.
(1) Expected value of releasing, non-monetary values
EV R= a(1-PA) + b(PA)
(2)

Expected value of holding, non-monetary values
EV H = c(1-PA) + d(PA)

(3)

Threshold probability for releasing, non-monetary values
PA* = (a-c) / (a-b-c+d)
PA* = B/ (A+B) in simplified version
PA* - 1/ (X+I1) in a further simplified version where
X = A/B

(4) Expected value of releasing, monetary values
EVR= - (RB+RC) (1-PA) ± (RB+RC) (PA)
where RC is a negative number, and there are no re-

leasing costs when the defendant appears
(5) Expected value of holding, monetary values
EVH = (HB+HC) (1-PA) + (HB+HC) (PA)
where HC is a negative number, and there are no
holding benefits when the defendant would have appeared
(6)

Threshold probability for releasing, monetary values
PA* = [ (RB+RC) - (HB+HC)] / RC-HB
where a negative number divided by a negative number is a positive number, which as a probability
should be between 0 and 1, unless releasing (or holding) always produces more net benefits (B-C) than
holding (or releasing) regardless of PA

Decision rule on releasing or holding
Release if EV R > EV H (i.e., if PA > PA*)
Hold if EVH > EV R (i.e., if PA* > PA
(8) Combined probabilities
B = (PF)(PN)
A= (PA)(PN)
D = (PF) (PC)
(PA) (PC)
C(7)

(9)

Relating PA and PH to bond level category
3
2
C
PA=a+b 1 C+b 2 C +b 3
PH = a' + b' 1 C +52 C2 + b' 3 C3
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(10) Optimum bond-level category
C*
C where PA - PH is a maximum positive difference

C*= (-2B 2 - L -[2B2
(11)

2

- 12B 1 B 3

/6B

3

Probability of appearing for all defendants
PA' = (1- PH) (PA) + (PH) (1- X. PF)
where PA and PF apply to released defendants, and
X equals how many times greater than PF is the
probability of a held defendant failing to appear if
he were released

